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Undoing Miranda
Michael Edmund O’Neill ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
You have the right to remain silent. If you choose to waive that right,
anything you say may, and likely will, be used against you. You have
the right to consult with an attorney. If you cannot afford to retain
counsel, the state will provide you with legal assistance at no cost to
you.1
How are the mighty fallen . . . ! 2

Icons sometimes fall. And when they do, they tend to fall hard.
While not yet toppled, Miranda v. Arizona, an icon of the Warren
Court’s transformation of American criminal procedure,3 is teetering
on the brink. On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court unleashed a
firestorm that not only burned within the legal community, but ignited the popular imagination as well. Watch any generic crime show
on television and at some point in the drama, a world-weary cop will

∗ Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University Law School; Commissioner,
United States Sentencing Commission. This article is dedicated to Akhil Amar, for his support;
Paul Cassell, for his indefatigable work; Yale Kamisar, for his provocative scholarship on this
subject; and, most of all, to Joseph Grano, without whose seminal scholarship this piece would
not have been possible. I would also like to offer special thanks to Laird Kirkpatrick, Erik Jaffe,
and my research assistants, Ghida Aljuburi and Danielle Giroux. The views expressed herein are
my own. They do not reflect those of the United States Sentencing Commission, and thus any
errors can be attributed solely to me.
1. The now-familiar warnings can be heard on any American cop show, circa 1966present; see also, Fred Inbau, Commentary: Over Reaction—the Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona,
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797 (1982) (discussing various formulations of the warnings).
2. 2 Sam. 1:25 (King James).
3. A 1974 American Bar Association survey of lawyers, judges, and legal academics discovered that Miranda was the third most notable decision of all time, trailing only Marbury v.
Madison and United States v. Nixon in terms of notoriety. Amazingly, given the group that was
surveyed, it even ranked ahead of Brown v. Board of Education. See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN,
MILESTONES! 200 YEARS OF AMERICAN LAW: MILESTONES IN OUR LEGAL HISTORY vi-vii
(1976). I daresay that were a survey taken of the public at-large, Miranda might rank even
higher.
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warn the hapless suspect that he has the right to remain silent, to obtain counsel, and, if impoverished, to retain counsel on the state’s
tab. Miranda has so permeated the popular culture that not even my
word processor’s spell-checker picks it up. Of course, Miranda has
not only invaded the popular culture; it has also been the fodder for
political debate. Listen to any politician on the stump inveighing
against the “coddling” of criminals, and some criticism of Miranda
is almost sure to emerge.
Despite its prominence, Miranda’s continuing vitality as a mandatory rule of police procedure has been threatened. The threat? The
unlikely resuscitation of a statute long believed dead: 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501. Enacted by Congress in 1968 to replace Miranda’s compulsory warnings with the former “voluntariness” test, § 3501 has enjoyed relative obscurity in the criminal practice world, but has long
been a favorite of those bent on rewriting the Warren Court’s handbook on criminal procedure. Their efforts to revive the statute have
recently paid off. In United States v. Dickerson,4 the Fourth Circuit
resurrected this little-known curiosity of criminal procedure and held
that it, not Miranda, governs the admissibility of confessions.5
The fact that the Fourth Circuit relied on § 3501 to determine a
confession’s admissibility is not half as interesting as why that statute
languished in purgatory for so long. How could a statute, duly enacted by Congress to overrule a controversial decision, signed by the
president and upheld (more or less) on several occasions, sink almost
without a trace? This article will discuss Miranda’s jurisprudential
roots and will trace the odd journey of § 3501—the statute that even
prosecutors could not quite bring themselves to love.6 In so doing, I
will revisit Miranda’s oft-debated constitutional status and examine
Congress’s institutional authority to alter rules designed to safeguard
constitutional guarantees.
For example, the Miranda Court itself suggested that the nowfamiliar prophylactic warnings were not compelled by the Fifth
Amendment, and even went so far as to invite attempts to implement
other approaches that would protect criminal suspects’ rights. However, the Court never explained how it could purport to exercise su4. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
5. See id. at 692.
6. As I write this piece, the Solicitor General’s Office has reversed long-standing Justice
Department policy and joined the defendant in Dickerson to challenge § 3501’s constitutionality.

186

ONE-FIN.DOC

185]

5/20/00 7:23 PM

Undoing Miranda

pervisory authority over state courts—a power the Court has recently
recognized it does not possess. Similarly, it is interesting to observe
that Congress did precisely what the Supreme Court challenged it to
do; namely, it devised an alternate means of protecting suspects’
rights. In light of the furor surrounding Miranda, and the harsh political criticism brought to bear on the Court in the decision’s wake,
it is worth asking why the statute purportedly overturning Miranda
was virtually ignored for well over a quarter century.
In Part II, this article examines the path leading to Miranda, focusing on the Supreme Court’s early reliance on the voluntariness
test for determining the admissibility of confessions and the Court’s
subsequent abandonment of that test in favor of restraints on police
investigatory practices. Part III then discusses the Miranda opinion
itself, bringing to light what the Warren Court said, and did not say,
in that landmark decision. Part IV describes congressional reaction to
Miranda, recounting the Senate hearings into the decision and detailing the floor debates surrounding § 3501’s enactment. Despite
Congress’s sometime inflammatory rhetoric, it is interesting to note
that far from “overruling” the Court, Congress instead artfully incorporated the Miranda warnings into a scheme that offered suspects considerably more protection than they had enjoyed prior to
Miranda, while simultaneously balancing the suspect’s rights against
law enforcement’s legitimate needs. Part V canvasses the statute’s curious litigation history, starting with the Johnson Administration’s
tepid support for the legislation and ending with the Clinton Administration’s outright hostility towards it. Part VI revisits recent
congressional efforts to reawaken interest in the statute, chiefly by
grilling Justice Department officials about their support for the legislation and initiating calls for the statute to be enforced. Part VII discusses § 3501’s treatment in the Supreme Court. Finally, Part VIII
concludes with some general observations on the constitutional issues swirling around the statute.
I conclude that, while § 3501 survives constitutional scrutiny, it
nevertheless raises several important issues demanding judicial resolution, the chief of which involves the role Congress plays in constitutional interpretation. Although the Supreme Court has long dominated the field of “saying what the law is,” both legislators and
executive branch officials must interpret constitutional provisions in
fulfilling their responsibilities. This careful balance creates room for
Congress, in enforcing constitutional norms, to use its institutional
187
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advantages to carve out a role for itself in generating procedural rules
designed to safeguard substantive constitutional guarantees. It is my
claim that the Miranda warnings are grounded not in the Fifth
Amendment, but are instead designed to be a type of anticipatory
remedy for potential constitutional violations. As such, though the
warnings serve to secure constitutional rights, they are not themselves constitutionally guaranteed. Where the Court has constructed
its “pre-remedy” around predictive facts, as opposed to present facts,
Congress may rely on its own institutional superiority for factgathering to reject the Court’s assessment of predictive facts and to
modify the Court’s anticipatory remedy—at least so long as Congress’s proposed remedy is sufficient to protect the threatened right.
II. THE ROAD TO MIRANDA
If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, then so is the
path to contemporary restrictions on police interrogation. Courts
have long sought to strike a balance between the state’s need to investigate criminal activity and the individual’s right to privacy and
personal autonomy. Throughout history, governments have pursued
those suspected of wrongdoing and questioned them about their
conduct. This is hardly novel. One does not have to be Sherlock
Holmes to understand that the interrogation of suspects generally
has been considered the best way—indeed, sometimes the only
way—to obtain information about criminal activity.7 In the United
States, however, this desire to ferret out crime has been tempered by
an understanding that police interrogation methods, however laudable, might nonetheless lend themselves to abuse. After all, the desire
to obtain a confession provides an incentive for investigators to press
suspects. As a result, the framers of the Bill of Rights adopted a pro7. Justice Jackson once observed that the “interrogation of those who know something
about the facts is the chief means to the solution of crime.” Stein v. New York, 364 U.S. 156,
184 (1953). Similarly, Justice Felix Frankfurter once explained that “offenses frequently occur . . . [in which] nothing remains—if police investigation is not to be balked before it has
fairly begun—but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them questions.” Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961); see also Fred Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the
United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. (Northwestern University) 442, 447 (1948)
(noting that even the best police departments depend on interrogations and confessions to
solve many criminal cases); cf. LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT?
92 (1959) (stating that “[p]revailing opinion seems to be that police interrogation is the
method most effective under contemporary American conditions for fastening guilt on the seasoned lawbreaker”).
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vision, by then already popular in the several states, that no person
shall “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”8 The Fifth Amendment’s provision against compelled selfincrimination, however, was generally construed as applying only to
the introduction of the defendant’s confession at trial. Hence, while
it may not have been a Fifth Amendment violation for police to coerce a suspect’s confession outside of court, it might well have run
afoul of the Constitution if prosecutors had attempted to introduce
that statement at the suspect’s trial.
A. The Process of Interrogation
Interestingly, the aggrieved party often conducted early criminal
investigations.9 Under common law practices, the private prosecutor
would bring the suspect before a judicial officer for questioning.10
The judicial officer would then conduct a preliminary examination to
uncover salient information to be used at trial.11 As intermediaries of
the state, judicial officers were subject to various formal (and informal) constraints. The nineteenth century, however, witnessed the
development of professional police forces, which marked the transition from judicial to police interrogation. Police officers, while
cloaked with the state’s authority, were not subject to the same restrictions placed upon magistrates. Unlike magistrates, their investigations were not subject to public scrutiny; indeed, police investigations routinely took place out of the public view, often behind the
closed doors of the station house.12 Police inquiries were thus more
efficient in uncovering information than those conducted by judicial
officers. As a consequence, pretrial judicial inquiries all but disappeared.
This transition from pretrial judicial inquiries to police inquiries
went largely unchallenged. No specific constitutional provision confers the power of interrogation on the government. This power, as
Thurgood Marshall observed (while serving as Solicitor General)
during oral argument in Westover v. United States 13 (one of
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good (draft on file
with the author).
10. See MAYERS, supra note 7, at 16, 86-87, 100-02, 223-24.
11. See id.
12. See generally id.
13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Miranda’s companion cases), “is inherent in the investigatory process. . . . I don’t think it has ever been questioned.”14 Broad as this
power may have been, the police exercised this authority for the
most part without close supervision or any particular judicial oversight. Granting police such authority was generally thought to be
“indispensable to crime detection.”15
B. Confessions and Crime Solving
Confessions have long been crucial to the successful resolution of
criminal cases. However obtained, confessions generally have been
considered to be a reliable form of evidence.16 A confession, quite
unlike most forms of evidence, is capable of supplying “ways of verifying itself,” and, like a statement against interest, provides powerful
evidence of guilt. Confessions are so powerful, in fact, that courts
have been careful to scrutinize the process by which they are extracted. Courts have been concerned not only about the potential
harm to the confessor, but also about possible taint to the judicial
system from admitting unreliable evidence. A confession obtained by
torture is, of course, unlikely to be reliable: a threat to remove one’s
toenails may induce even the most stalwart soul to say whatever a
grand inquisitor might want.
A confession obtained as a result of simple deception, however,
presents quite a different matter. The reliability of such a confession
might not be compromised if the interrogators do nothing to overcome the suspect’s will. For example, in the justly famous Christian
Burial case, Brewer v. Williams,17 there was little chance that the confession was erroneous. In that case, a little girl was missing and presumed dead. A suspect, Robert Williams, turned himself into police.
Although instructed to not interrogate Williams, the police officers
played upon the suspect’s religious inclinations, asking him to consider the poor, lifeless little girl lying out in the harsh elements. Such

14. RICHARD J. MEDALIE, FROM ESCOBEDO TO MIRANDA: THE ANATOMY OF A
SUPREME COURT DECISION 134 (1966).
15. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961); cf. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 58 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that in cases in which no external evidence
exists, the alternative to interrogation is “to close the books on the crime and forget it with the
suspect at large”).
16. See Watts, 338 U.S. at 58 (Jackson, J., concurring).
17. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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a little girl, the officers opined, deserved a “Christian burial.”18 Williams relented and led the officers to the girl’s body.19 Such tactics by
the officers, while doubtless designed to elicit some sort of response
from Williams, likely would not have resulted in a false confession.
After all, only the guilty party would likely have known where the
body was. A confession can thus be a particularly trustworthy device
for separating the guilty chaff from the innocent wheat.
C. Voluntariness as a Proxy for Credibility
The Supreme Court, like the public at large, was not particularly
troubled that certain suspects might erroneously believe that they
were obligated to cooperate with the police. If police questioning
was to be effective, suspects ought to believe they had a duty to cooperate. After all, it was not the investigating officer’s duty to provide the suspect with unsolicited free legal advice, but to interrogate
him. Explaining to a suspect her constitutional rights would thus be
contradictory to the state’s purpose in permitting custodial interrogation.20 In light of this understanding, the Court did not feel the
need to burden the government with any particular duty to inform
the suspect that she need not cooperate with police. As long as the
confession was freely offered, and hence likely to be credible, the
process used to obtain it was of little concern. When police did, in
the odd case, choose to advise a suspect of his right to silence, the
suspect’s knowledge was traditionally considered a factor contributing to the “voluntariness” of the confession.21 Conversely, the absence of such counseling might weigh against the confession’s admissibility given the “totality of the circumstances.”
Understood, if not embraced, was the notion that some pressure
upon the suspect was both inevitable and indispensable to the investigatory process.22 For example, confronting a suspect with evidence
18. Id. at 393.
19. See id. at 390-93.
20. Professors Inbau and Reid, authors of the first influential work on police interrogation methods, noted that “in the absence of a statutory provision specifically requiring a criminal interrogator to warn a suspect or accused person, it is unnecessary to do so.” FRED INBAU
& JOHN REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 163-64 (1962).
21. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438 (1958).
22. Professor Fred E. Inbau, in his textbook on interrogation for law enforcement officers, captured the judicial, as well as the popular, sentiment when he asserted that criminal suspects must be dealt with “in a somewhat lower moral plane than that in which ethical, lawabiding citizens are expected to conduct their everyday affairs.” FRED INBAU & JOHN REID,
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of her guilt was not an infrequent means of obtaining a confession.
Such techniques were, of course, far more effective if the suspect did
not have counsel by her side. Consequently, the pre-Escobedo Court
considered the denial of counsel to a suspect who had requested
counsel or who had even retained counsel as but one factor among
the “totality of the circumstances” used to determine whether the
confession would be excluded as a violation of due process. The Supreme Court realized that counsel’s presence “would effectively preclude police questioning—fair as well as unfair,”23 and “would constrict . . . [police ability] to solve difficult cases.”24
Of course, the police were not granted unbridled discretion in
questioning suspects. The confession’s reliability was of obvious import.25 With the movement towards police, as opposed to judicial,
interrogation, came the alleged use of so-called “third degree” tactics
by police officers.26 The problem with such tactics is that while they
may have done an excellent job of producing a confession, they
could not always be counted on to produce a reliable confession.
Pretrial investigatory practices thus came to be judicially scrutinized, at least in part, because courts were concerned about the reliability of confessions. In federal cases, the preferred means of scrutinizing such conduct became the Fifth Amendment.27 Although the
Fifth Amendment’s compelled self-incrimination clause appeared to
pertain strictly to the trial setting, the Supreme Court soon deployed
it to examine pretrial interrogations. Before the Court invoked the
Fifth Amendment to scrutinize state cases, it relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The process due the
criminal suspect, it seems, extended to a “fair” interrogation. HowLIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 196-97 (3d ed. 1948); see also Larson, Present Police and Legal Methods for the Determination of the Innocence or Guilt of the Suspect, 16 J.
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 252 (1925).
23. Crooker, 357 U.S. at 433.
24. Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958).
25. Even in the days when people believed in the existence of witches, there was some
awareness that not all confessed witches were credible. For example, in 1672, in Massachusetts
Bay Colony, John Broadstreet admitted to “having familiarity with the devil,” but the court
was so unimpressed that they fined him for telling a lie and sent him home. K. ERIKSON,
WAYWARD PURITANS 155 (1966).
26. Such abuses were the subject of the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness. WICKERSHAM COMM’N, NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PUB. NO. 11, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 158-60 (1931).
27. See infra Part II.D.
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ever, the focus on these cases was not so much on what the interrogators had done, but on whether the confession was the product of
the suspect’s free will.
D. Voluntariness and the Fifth Amendment
Voluntariness has long been the touchstone for determining
whether a confession violated the protection against compelled selfincrimination. In one of its earliest interpretations of the Fifth
Amendment, the Court in Sparf & Hansen v. United States,28 focused on whether the challenged confession was the product of the
confessor’s free will. In Sparf, the second mate of an American sailing vessel disappeared under mysterious circumstances. The captain
of the vessel identified three suspects and promptly ordered them
placed in leg irons and held below deck for the return voyage. During the suspects’ subsequent trial, the captain and two other crew
members testified concerning an alleged confession made to them by
one of the imprisoned defendants. The Court ruled that this testimony was admissible on the grounds that the confession was voluntarily given—despite the apparently minor fact that the confessor was
clamped in leg irons and held in the brig.29 In dicta, the Court suggested that the confession would have been involuntary, and thus inadmissible, only if it had been adduced by violence, the threat of
punishment, or false promises of mercy.30 Absent such specific pressures deisgned to overcome the suspect’s will, a confession would be
deemed voluntary.
The Court subsequently refined the voluntariness test in Bram v.
United States.31 In Bram the Court took a much more nuanced view
of what would constitute compulsion. Bram, like Sparf before it, involved murder on the high seas, specifically the murder of the captain, the captain’s wife, and the second mate. When suspicion focused on one Mr. Brown, a crew member, he in turn fingered Bram,
the first mate. Bram was placed in irons and, when the ship reached
port, turned over to police authorities.32

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

156 U.S. 51 (1895).
See id. at 54.
See id. at 55-56.
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
See id. 534-37.
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The police interrogation unfolded as follows:
When Mr. Bram came into my office I said to him: “Bram, we are
trying to unravel this horrible mystery.” I said: “Your position is
rather an awkward one. I have had Brown in this office and he
made a statement that he saw you do the murder.” He said: “He
could not have seen me; where was he?” I said: “He states he was
at the wheel.” “Well,” he said, “he could not see me from there.” I
said: “Now, look here, Bram, I am satisfied that you killed the captain from all I have heard from Mr. Brown. But,” I said, “some of
us here think you could not have done all that crime alone. If you
had an accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of
this horrible crime on your own shoulders.” He said: “Well, I
think, and many others on board the ship think, that Brown is the
murderer; but I don’t know anything about it.” He was rather
short in his replies.33

The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in admitting
this testimony and thus reversed Bram’s conviction. Relying upon
the Fifth Amendment, the Court explained that “the generic language of the [Fifth] Amendment was but a crystallization of the doctrine [excluding involuntary] confessions.”34 What was the involuntary confession? The Court observed that Bram’s statement that
Brown “could not see me from there,” might possibly be understood
as an inadvertent admission of guilt.35 According to the Court, the
police had secured this alleged “confession” by threatening Bram.
How? Essentially, in reminding the defendant of Brown’s accusation
against him, the police “produce[d] upon his mind the fear that if he
remained silent it would be considered an admission of guilt, and
therefore render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty
person.”36 Despite the somewhat tenuous nature of this threat, it was
clear that the Court was focused on the process of the interrogation as
creating the Fifth Amendment violation.
E. Due Process and Voluntariness
Although the Court voiced a similar refrain when it embarked
upon a review of confessions obtained in state courts, it lacked an

33.
34.
35.
36.
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obvious vehicle to do so. As the Fifth Amendment had yet to be incorporated against the states, the Court instead relied on the Due
Process Clause in Brown v. Mississippi.37 If ever a case cried out for
review, it was Brown. At trial, a deputy sheriff admitted to beating
the codefendant prisoners with a metal buckled leather strap and
boldly claimed that if the decision had been his alone, he would have
whipped them harder.38 The beating, he said, was “[n]ot too much
for a negro.”39
In unanimously reversing Brown’s conviction, the Court explained that the severe beatings, used to obtain confessions from the
shackled defendants, made the confessions involuntary and thus deprived Brown and his codefendants of due process.40 Brown showcased the Court’s dual concerns about the means by which the confession was obtained as well as the confession’s reliability. The means
used, severe beatings, doubtless led to presumptively unreliable confessions. As in Sparf, the issue turned on whether the external pressures brought to bear on the defendant overcame the suspect’s ability to choose to confess freely.
Only a few short years later, in Chambers v. Florida,41 the Court
further explored the limits that Due Process placed on obtaining
confessions. Following Isaiah Chambers’s arrest for the murder of an
elderly man, the local sheriff threatened Chambers with the specter
of mob violence and then took him to jail, purportedly for his own
37. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Brown was not the Court’s first confession case. Nearly 40
years earlier, as discussed previously, in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court
utilized the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to reverse a federal conviction. Even before Bram, the Court relied upon the common law rules of evidence prohibiting
promises of leniency or threats to hold confessions inadmissible. The common law rule barring
the admissibility of involuntary confessions emerged during the eighteenth century in England.
Its development is chronicled in 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§§ 817-820(C) (3d ed. 1940) and LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968). In the United States, the Supreme Court
first invoked the rule in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). Reviewing a death sentence for a
murder conviction in Hopt, Justice Harlan, without referring to any constitutional provision,
concluded for a unanimous Court that the confession was voluntary and therefore admissible.
See id.; cf. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (holding that the confessions
of a person imprisoned and in irons, given under accusations of having committed a capital
offense, are admissible in evidence if the confessions appear to have been made voluntarily and
were not obtained by putting the suspect in fear or by making promises).
38. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 284.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 285-86.
41. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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“safety.” At the jail, a barrage of officers questioned him continuously for five days and an entire night before he made a “sunrise confession.”42 A unanimous Court reversed Chambers’s conviction, explaining that the questioning occurred “under circumstances
calculated to break the strongest nerves and the stoutest resistance.”43 Essentially, because any person in Chambers’s position
would likely have confessed, the Supreme Court determined that the
confession was inadmissible.
F. Policing the Police: Voluntariness as Fairness
In both Bram and Chambers, the Supreme Court used “voluntariness” as the test for determining a confession’s reliability. If the
confession was not the product of the suspect’s free will, it was likely
not reliable. Of course, the Court could have chosen to permit the
confession to have been adduced at trial and subjected to cross examination, but that may have undermined the suspect’s ability to rely
effectively on the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
While a voluntariness test made perfect sense in the Fifth Amendment context, it perhaps translated less well to consideration under
the Due Process Clause. What, under the Fourteenth Amendment,
was the process due the suspect? Over time a subtle shift occurred.
The voluntariness test evolved from a credibility determination into a
means of assessing police interrogation practices. Voluntariness is a
notoriously difficult concept to prove;44 whether the police misbehaved, however, is not. As a practical matter, the Court’s focus thus
shifted from the defendant to the police—from whether the confession was reliable to whether the process employed to obtain the confession was appropriate. For the Supreme Court, policing the police
was a simpler task than trying accurately to assess the defendant’s
state of mind.
In Lisenba v. California,45 for example, the Court expressly
stated that to meet due process requirements, the police would have
42. Id. at 235.
43. Id. at 238-39.
44. The test for determining voluntariness has been oft-criticized. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar,
Gates, “Probable Cause,” “Good Faith” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 570 (1984) (stating
that in pre-Escobedo, pre-Miranda days when the voluntariness test prevailed, “[a]lmost everything was relevant, but almost nothing was decisive”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and
the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867-78 (1981) (book review).
45. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
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to use methods that comported with concepts of fundamental fairness to secure confessions.46 “The aim of the requirement of due
process,” the Court explained, “[was] not to exclude presumptively
false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of
evidence, whether true or false.”47 This marked a significant break
with the past. If the confession was itself corroborated by evidence
beyond the suspect’s statement, the reconstructed voluntariness test
still enabled the Court to scrutinize police conduct and to suppress
any resulting statement. The Court went so far as to proclaim in
Rogers v. Richmond 48 that the defendant’s statement must be evaluated with “complete disregard of whether or not . . . [he] spoke the
truth.”49
The Court’s turn from credibility to process as the touchstone
for voluntariness reached an apex in Spano v. New York,50 where the
Court disapproved the police’s decision to use an officer, who was
the accused’s longtime friend, to pressure him into confessing.51Defendant Spano allegedly shot a former professional boxer who had
stolen his money and physically assaulted him. After the shooting,
Spano disappeared, resurfacing only to call one Gaspar Bruno, a
close friend of many years’ standing. In addition to being Spano’s
friend, Bruno was also a fledgling police officer. According to
Bruno’s testimony, Spano told him “that he took a terrific beating,
that the deceased hurt him real bad and he dropped him a couple of
times and he was dazed; he didn’t know what he was doing and that
he went and shot at him.”52 Spano also informed Bruno that he intended to get a lawyer and turn himself in.
Spano was as good as his word, surrendering himself to the police the following day. Cautioned by his attorney not to talk, however, Spano repeatedly refused to answer the officers’ questions. After it became apparent that Spano had listened to his counsel’s

46. See id. at 236.
47. Id.
48. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
49. Id. at 544. In Stein v. New York, , Justice Frankfurter wrote that judges must avoid
being influenced by “the confirmation of details in the confession by reliable other evidence”
or by a “feeling of certitude that the accused is guilty of the crime to which he confessed.”
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 200 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
51. See id. at 323.
52. Id. at 317.
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advice, the officers’ tactics changed. They called Bruno and instructed him to tell Spano that his earlier telephone call had gotten
him (Bruno) “in a lot of trouble” with his superiors.53 Although
Bruno thrice tried to get Spano to open up to him by telling him
that his job was in jeopardy unless he confessed, Spano steadfastly refused. Finally, on Bruno’s fourth try, Spano succumbed to his
friend’s pleas to save his job and agreed to talk.54
The Court’s opinion in Spano focuses both on the officers’ conduct (the repeated interrogation, the use of trickery) and Spano’s
personal characteristics (his friendship with Bruno and his status as
an immigrant). However, the Court concentrated more closely on
the officers’ conduct in obtaining the confession than on whether
Spano’s confession was credible.55 Spano, in one important respect,
presaged Miranda. The Court disapproved of the officer’s interrogation tactics, even though the credibility of Spano’s confession was
never seriously questioned, the pressure on Spano was not inordinate, and he did not seem to be an easily subverted defendant.
G. Promulgating Rules of Engagement
Since its first review of a state confession case in Brown, the
Court increasingly patrolled police interrogation practices. The voluntariness test, based upon a review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession, enabled trial courts to scrutinize
the process of obtaining confessions. Commencing with Haynes v.
Washington,56 however, the Supreme Court began a steady drift away
from the strict totality-of-the-circumstances test. In Haynes, the
Court examined evidence of alleged police coercion in securing the
defendant’s confession.57 The trial court had instructed the jury not
to consider the fact that the police had not warned the defendant
that he was under arrest, had a right to remain silent, or that he had
a right to counsel in assessing whether the confession was voluntary.58 The trial court was not unreasonable in believing that voluntariness was quite independent of the defendant’s awareness of his

53. Id. at 319.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 321-24.
56. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
57. See id. at 506.
58. See id. at 514-15.
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legal rights. The Supreme Court however, was not so sure and thus
made perhaps its first stab at transforming police investigators into
legal counsel. Although the Court did not find that the officers’ failure to warn the defendant of his rights created an independent
ground for reversal, it did note that this omission raised a “serious
and substantial question whether a proper constitutional standard
was applied by the jury.”59
If the Court was merely testing the waters in Haynes, it jumped
in headfirst the following year in Massiah v. United States 60 and Escobedo v. Illinois.61 These cases became the ideological progenitors of
Miranda.
1. Massiah and the right to counsel
Massiah turned on the admissibility of the defendant’s incriminating statements to a confederate who, without Massiah’s knowledge, was cooperating with the police.62 Massiah made his statements during an on-going investigation into a narcotics conspiracy in
which he was deeply involved. Interestingly, Massiah made his slip of
the tongue while on bail, after having retained counsel and pleaded
not guilty to a narcotics offense.63
The Supreme Court reversed his conviction despite the fact that
Massiah suffered no (conventional) pressure and had no idea that he
was speaking to a government informant. The Court explained that
obtaining a statement in this manner violated Massiah’s right to assistance of counsel.64 In effect, the Court created a rule that officers
may not elicit information from a suspect represented by counsel if
that counsel is not present. This was truly a remarkable decision.
Aside from a reinterpretation (and extension) of the Sixth Amendment’s right to assistance of counsel, it also marked the Court’s attempt to craft rules of engagement for police. Taken to its logical extreme, the Court’s decision in Massiah effectively prohibited the
police from questioning represented parties.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 515.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03.
See id. at 202.
See id. at 207.
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2. Escobedo and the erosion of the voluntariness test
What Massiah did for the right to assistance of counsel, Escobedo
v. Illinois 65 did for confessions. Escobedo is generally recognized as
the beginning of the end for the voluntariness test. In Escobedo, the
police questioned Danny Escobedo in connection with his brotherin-law’s murder.66 Although the interrogation lasted for several hours
before Escobedo’s attorney secured his release, he made no statement. Shortly thereafter, the police learned from another suspect,
one DiGerlando, that Escobedo had been the trigger man. The police again plucked Escobedo from the street and subjected him to intense questioning. No fool, Escobedo asked to speak with his lawyer.
In the meantime, unbeknownst to Escobedo, his attorney had unsuccessfully attempted to contact him at the station where he was being held. When questioned, Escobedo declared that DiGerlando was
a liar. One of the detectives challenged Escobedo to repeat that accusation to DiGerlando’s face and Escobedo agreed. When DiGerlando was brought in, Escobedo declared “I didn’t shoot Manuel,
you did it.”67 Apparently ignorant of the concept of accomplice liability, Escobedo’s statement implicated him in the murder.
The Court’s reasoning in Escobedo departed significantly from
previous cases in this area. The police had not used force or trickery
to compel Escobedo’s statement; nor was Escobedo a “vulnerable
victim.” Indeed, Escobedo had successfully resisted earlier attempts
at questioning and had even retained counsel. In fact, the record
showed that counsel had communicated to Escobedo what he
“should do in the event of interrogation.”68 Thus, it could be argued
that Escobedo had sage advice from counsel and had endeavored to
follow that advice. In examining the totality of the circumstances
surrounding Escobedo’s inculpatory statement, it would be difficult
to find that the statement was, in the conventional sense, the product of coercion.
The Court nevertheless disagreed. In a five-to-four decision, the
Court reversed the conviction and held the statement inadmissible:

65.
66.
67.
68.
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We hold . . . that where . . . the investigation . . . has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied “the
Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment . . . .69

By ignoring the actual circumstances surrounding the interrogation and focusing instead on Escobedo’s ignorance of the law, the
Court laid the foundation for the right to counsel during custodial
interrogation and thus opened the door to Miranda.
III. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA:70 DECISION AND MYTH
A. The Confession
Ernesto Miranda seemed to be an appropriate poster boy for
championing individual liberties in the face of untoward police interrogation tactics.71 He allegedly kidnapped and brutally raped an
eighteen-year-old woman.72 Although Miranda’s alleged victim failed
to identify him in a police line-up, the investigating officers used a
bit of trickery to elicit a confession.73 When Miranda asked how he
had done after the line-up, the police disingenuously replied “you
flunked.”74 Believing (incorrectly) that the victim had positively identified him in the line-up, Miranda resignedly confessed not only to
the rape for which he was arrested, but also to the robbery and at-

69. Id. at 490-91.
70. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
71. So were any of the defendants in Miranda’s three companion cases, Vignera v. New
York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). According to
the Court, each of the four cases shared certain “salient features,” among them “incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at
445. Instead of receiving Miranda warnings, we could easily be discussing Vignera, Westover,
or Stewart warnings.
72. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 12 (1983). In his excellent
article on § 3501 and Dickerson, Paul Cassell describes, apparently for the first time, many of
the details surrounding Miranda’s confession. See Paul Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18
U.S.C. 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 186-90 (1999).
73. See BAKER, supra note 72, at 12.
74. Id.
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tempted rape of a second victim and to the attempted robbery of a
third woman.75 Miranda hand-wrote a complete confession and then
signed a prepared statement admitting that he had voluntarily confessed “with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any
statement I make may be used against me.”76 No evidence suggested
that the police in any way “forced” Miranda to respond to police
questioning.
Miranda’s confession readily complied with then-existing standards for voluntariness. Unlike the defendant in Bram,77 he was not
tortured into confessing. One of the officers in fact testified that he
told Miranda that he was not required to answer their questions.78 In
contrast to Chambers, he was not held for hours or subjected to a
barrage of questions by numerous law enforcement officers. Instead,
Miranda was held for fewer than two hours and questioned during
normal business hours by only two officers.79 He was subjected to
none of the usual deprivations suffered by those who had been
“compelled” to confess.80 Miranda’s confession thus did not seem a
likely candidate for suppression.
B. The Decision
Why did the Court demand that Miranda’s confession be suppressed? Because the Court implicitly found that a custodial confession was tantamount to a compelled confession. The Court stressed
that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation . . . contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would otherwise not do so freely.”81 The Court’s concern
was plainly not with so-called third-degree tactics, which were “undoubtedly the exception now.”82 Instead, the Court struggled with
the very existence of custodial interrogation. “An individual swept
75. See id. at 13.
76. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (internal punctuation omitted).
77. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
78. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491 n.66.
79. See id. at 518-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. Chief Justice Warren noted that “[i]n these cases, we might not find the defendants’
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms.” Id. at 457.
81. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 447. Indeed, Justice Harlan furthered observed that “[p]eaceful interrogation
is not one of the dark moments of the law.” Id. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to . . . techniques of persuasion,” the
Court explained, “cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak.”83 To buttress this factual determination in which it equated
custodial interrogation with coercion, the Court did little more than
survey police manuals to paint a picture of police interrogation practices;84 trot out the then thirty-plus year old Wickersham Report,
which described alleged third-degree tactics used by police in the
1930s;85 and rehash anecdotal evidence gleaned from individual
cases.86 While there is assuredly some common-sense truth to the existence of an inherently coercive atmosphere whenever the police
question a suspect, the Court broke new ground with the breadth of
its holding. “[N]ever,” as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent,
has the Fifth Amendment “been thought to forbid all pressure to incriminate one’s self in the situations covered by it.”87 Nor had the
Court ever found a confession produced during an unwarned interrogation necessarily to be involuntary.
Acknowledging that it might not have found Miranda’s statements “to have been involuntary in traditional terms,” the Court explained that this did not obviate the need “for adequate safeguards
to protect” the Fifth Amendment right against compelled selfincrimination.88 And what were those “procedural safeguards?” Borrowing a page from that champion of individual liberties, J. Edgar
Hoover, the Court held that, prior to any custodial interrogation,
the police must warn a suspect that “he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used . . . against him, and
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed.”89 Failure to abide by the warnings would result in the
automatic exclusion of any statements obtained by the police: “the
prosecution may not use statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 461.
See id. at 448-55.
See id. at 445, 447-48.
See id. at 445-47.
Id. at 512 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 457.
Id. at 444; see also id. at 479, 483 n.54.
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incrimination.”90 Rather than granting those warnings indispensibility, the Court-prescribed warnings were required only in the absence
of “other fully effective means . . . devised to inform accused persons
of their right to silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it.”91
The Court rendered entirely irrelevant a suspect’s personal traits.
A serious criticism of the voluntariness test focused on the fact that a
suspect who was unfamiliar with his rights as a result of inadequate
education, inferior economic status, or emotional or mental instability, was at a serious disadvantage with respect to the more sophisticated criminal defendant.92 Consequently, the Court directed that
the warnings be uniformly administered without any consideration of
the accused’s age, status, experience, or any other criterion examined
under the traditional voluntariness test.93 If the police neglected to
inform the suspect of his rights prior to questioning, any statement
secured thereafter would be held inadmissible.94
The Court plainly viewed the arrested suspect from a different
perspective than had commonly been held in the past. Earlier Court
decisions had always envisioned—rightly or wrongly—an intelligent
citizen-suspect, perfectly able to resist standard police questioning
and unwilling, absent threats or fabricated promises of leniency, to
falsely confess to the commission of a crime. The Court rejected this
idealized conception of the criminal suspect as a hardy citizen. “No
amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been
aware of this right will suffice,” the Court declared.95 “Only through
such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was
aware of this right.”96
That the warnings were more a remedy than a constitutional
command is evidenced by the fact that the Court admitted, within
certain parameters, that legislatures could develop their own rules to
safeguard the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. “It is

90. Id. at 444.
91. Id.
92. See generally Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 60 TUL. L. REV. 2195
(1996); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987).
93. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
94. See id. at 493.
95. Id. at 471-72.
96. Id.
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impossible,” the majority explained, “for us to foresee the potential
alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by
Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-making
capacities.”97 Apparently expecting some sort of legislative response,
the Court thus refused to “say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted.”98Until such time as the legislature acted, however, it was up to the Court
to devise a means of safeguarding the right because “the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by
the courts.”99 The means the Court chose, of course, involved the
warnings provision. Essentially, the Court adopted an anticipatory
remedy to prevent the possible violation of the Fifth Amendment
right.
While Courts traditionally had balanced the individual’s right to
privacy and personal autonomy against society’s general need for
protection, the Miranda Court abandoned any such balancing notion and assumed what was a radical posture: treating the selfincrimination right as absolute and inviolable. Waivers of these
rights, though permissible, were to be viewed with suspicion. “If the
interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken,” the Court stressed, “a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel.”100 If the suspect refuses to waive her
rights, the police must halt questioning.101
An important thread running through the Court’s opinion is that
the warnings serve as a device that protects the underlying substantive right. As Professor David Strauss has observed, Miranda “reads
more like a legislative committee report with an accompanying statute” than a judicial decision.102 The Miranda majority in fact acknowledged that its decision was a bit out of the ordinary and that a
legislature might be a more appropriate authority to deal with the
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
(1988).

Id. at 467.
Id.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 475 (citation omitted).
See id. at 474-77.
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190
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problem confronting the Court: “[i]t is . . . urged upon us that we
withhold decision on this issue until state legislative bodies and advisory groups have had an opportunity to deal with these problems by
rule-making.”103 To this challenge, the Court responded:
We have already pointed out that the Constitution does not require
any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against
self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the
States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so
long as they are fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a
continuous opportunity to exercise it.104

In other words, the Court admitted that, within certain parameters, legislatures could develop their own rules to safeguard the selfincrimination privilege. For, as the Court explained, “[w]here rights
secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rulemaking or legislation which would abrogate them.”105 These somewhat cryptic, seemingly self-contradictory statements have fueled the
debate about whether the Court believed the warnings were themselves compelled by the Fifth Amendment.
I think it is fair to say that while the Court did not consider the
specific set of warnings it adopted as constitutionally compelled, it
anticipated that some prophylactic device would be legislated to deal
with the problem. Miranda is best viewed as having adopted a
means of enforcing the privilege against compelled self-incrimination
in the face of repeated violations. Essentially, the Court simply
adopted a practical, easily administered means of safeguarding the
right:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning
as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to
inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his
rights without a warning being given.106

Because the warnings were not themselves constitutional guarantees, the Court could clarify that Miranda “in no way creates a con-

103.
104.
105.
106.
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stitutional straightjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform,
nor is it intended to have this effect.”107 As opposed to thinking it
had rendered the final word on the subject, the Court wanted to encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search
for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.108
The sole caveat was that “unless we are shown other procedures
which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise
it, the following [Miranda] safeguards must be observed.”109
C. The Loyal Opposition
Each of the three dissenting opinions took a slightly different
view of the case. Justice Clark, who dissented in part and concurred
in the result of one of the cases, took issue with the Court’s replacement of the traditional voluntariness test. He questioned the Court’s
evidence relating to the inherently coercive nature of police questioning, believing that the Court had not “fairly characterized” police officers’ efforts.110 Justice Clark, who was not joined by the other
dissenters, merely advocated that the courts continue to adhere to
the voluntariness test.111
Justice Harlan was more resolute in his dissent. He offered that
the Court’s decision “represents poor constitutional law and entails
harmful consequences for the country at large.”112 As constitutional
law, Harlan explained that the Court’s decision broke with past interpretations of the Fifth Amendment and failed to establish any
principled basis for extending that Amendment to police interrogations.113 He further assailed the opinion as having a necessarily deleterious effect on law enforcement and being based on precious little
solid evidence.114 He chided the Court for not allowing legislatures
time to consider various solutions, noting that “legislative reform is
rarely speedy or unanimous . . . but [has] . . . the vast advantage of
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 467.
See id. at 467.
Id.
Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting).
See id. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 506-15 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 515-26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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empirical data and comprehensive study, [ ] would allow experimentation and use of solutions not open to courts, and [ ] would restore
the initiative in criminal law reform to those forums where it truly
belongs.”115
Justice White, too, challenged the decision’s historical footings,
arguing that neither the text nor the tradition of the Fifth Amendment provided any basis for the Court’s decision: “[T]he Court’s
holding today is neither compelled nor even strongly suggested by
the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at odds with American and
English legal history, and involves a departure from a long line of
precedent . . . .”116 While Justice White had no problem with the
Court “legislating” rules on the basis of purely speculative facts, he
did believe that the “advisability of its end product” demanded exploration.117 And in his view, that product was found wanting. He
dissected the Court’s determination that all custodial interrogations
were necessarily coercive, and found it irrational.118 He pointed out
that “if the defendant may not answer without a warning a question
such as ‘Where were you last night?’ without having his answer be a
compelled one, how can the Court ever accept his negative answer to
the question of whether he wants to consult . . . counsel . . . ?”119 He
also observed that “for all the Court’s expounding on the menacing
atmosphere of police interrogation procedures, it has failed to supply
any foundation for the conclusions it draws or the measures it
adopts.”120 Justice White explained:
I see nothing wrong or immoral, and certainly nothing unconstitutional, in the police’s asking a suspect whom they have reasonable
cause to arrest whether or not he killed his wife or in confronting

115. Id. at 524 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan noted in summary: “The foray
which the Court makes today brings to mind the wise and farsighted words of Mr. Justice
Jackson . . . ‘This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and
the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added.’ ” Id. at 526 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J.,
separate opinion)).
116. Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 532-37 (White, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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him with the evidence on which the arrest was based, at least where
he has been plainly advised that he may remain completely silent.121

In concluding that the warnings represented poor public policy,
Justice White predicted that “[i]n some unknown number of cases
the Court’s rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the
streets . . . to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him.”122
D. Untangling Miranda
Despite the Court’s solemn pronouncement that Miranda
touched upon fundamental constitutional principles, a mere week after the decision was handed down, the Court ruled in Johnson v. New
Jersey 123 that both Miranda and Escobedo were to have prospective
application only.124 The theory uniting these decisions was based
upon the Court’s conclusion that Miranda had not supplanted the
voluntariness test (at least with respect to trials pre-dating Miranda),
but had simply furnished additional protections to “guarantee full
effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination.”125 Miranda
was thus not viewed as a repudiation of the voluntariness test, but
simply as a refinement of that test. “[T]he nonretroactivity of these
decisions,” the majority noted, “will not preclude persons whose trials have already been completed from invoking the same safeguards
as part of an involuntariness claim.”126 A defendant may not have
been entitled to invoke Miranda per se, but could nonetheless argue
that the absence of Miranda warnings tended to make his confession
involuntary.
This conception of Miranda warnings as prophylactic rules
rather than rights is echoed in Davis v. North Carolina.127 In Davis,
the petitioner was convicted of a rape and murder.128 The Court recognized that “[t]he sole issue presented for review is whether the
confessions were voluntarily given or were the result of overbearing

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
384 U.S. 719 (1966).
See id. at 721.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 730.
384 U.S. 737 (1966).
See id. at 738.

209

ONE-FIN.DOC

5/20/00 7:23 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2000

by police authorities.”129 Observing that Miranda did not apply due
to the nonretroactive nature of the decision, the Court explained
that whether comparable warnings were given “is a significant factor
in considering the voluntariness of statements later made.”130 Upon
its examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
confession, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s confession was
not voluntary, but the product of police coercion.131
The Court’s decision in Davis highlighted the fact that the
Miranda warnings were not exactly a constitutional mandate, but instead served as a pragmatic safeguard to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights. In part, these cases presaged the Court’s later holdings that, for example, a confession taken in violation of Miranda,
but nevertheless not involuntary, could be used for impeachment
purposes.132 More will be said about this later. Let us turn now to
Congress’s reaction to Miranda.
IV. CONGRESS RESPONDS: 18 U.S.C. § 3501
Justice White’s ominous prediction in Miranda turned out to be
prescient. Escalating crime rates became the byword for the 1968
presidential election.133 Politicians latched on to the fact that fear of
crime elects candidates with tough-on-crime agendas. As a political
sop to quiet the cries of those clamoring for federal action on the
crime problem, President Lyndon Johnson, in February 1967, proposed a legislative package authorizing substantial federal grants to
state and local governments to improve law enforcement efforts.134
Although loaded with plenty of vote-getting pork, the President’s
proposed legislation did not propose any significant legal reforms.
Those were to come later.

129. Id. at 739.
130. Id. at 740.
131. See id. at 739, 752-53.
132. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 226 (1971).
133. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Report reported that from 1958 to 1964 “the incidence
of crime had been growing six times faster than the American population.” BAKER, supra note
72, at 39.
134. See ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, CONGRESS AGAINST THE COURT 1-3 (1970);
RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME 15-20 (1969).
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A. The Legislation

Whether Miranda had truly contributed to spiking crime rates,
Congress accepted the Court’s gracious invitation to “develop [its]
own safeguards for the privilege.”135 As a result of presidentiallysponsored crime reports calling for increased assistance to state and
local law enforcement,136 Congressman Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.) introduced President Johnson’s legislation in the House to provide
federal assistance grants to law enforcement.137 This bill was immediately referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which changed the
bill’s name to the “Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Act,” a
foreshadowing of events to come.138 Although the House bill significantly expanded federal monetary assistance to local law enforcement,139 it did not contain any of the provisions relating to Miranda
(or, in fact, to any of the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure cases).
At roughly the same time, Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) introduced the corresponding Senate version of the bill.140 It, too,
lacked the Miranda provisions. The House bill, unencumbered by
legal reforms and spurred on by parochial interests to subsidize local
law enforcement, was the first to emerge from floor debate and was
referred to the Senate.
135. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
136. The Executive Branch sponsored three influential crime reports that, at least in part,
spurred Congress to enact crime-control legislation. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRIME
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT (1966); FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORT—CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES—1967; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT—THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1967). Although the reports called for greater federal assistance in local crime control, none
deduced a link between rising crime rates and Supreme Court decisions affording criminal defendants greater protection. One report, in fact, disavowed any “satisfactory proof of a causal
relationship between the increasing crime rate and restraints on police interrogation.”
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 613 (1966). The
National Report, however, stated that “it is too early to assess the effect of the Miranda decision on law enforcement’s ability to secure confessions and to solve crimes.” THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, quoted in BAKER, supra note 72, at 203. Several on the Commission nevertheless urged that further study be devoted to determining whether such a link
existed.
137. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-5037 (1967), reprinted in 113 CONG. REC. 3113 (1967).
138. See Safe Streets, Gun Control Bills Stalled, 25 CONG. Q. 2380 (1967).
139. The House legislation was designed to significantly expand the reach of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-197, 79 Stat. 828 (1965), as amended by
Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-798, 80 Stat. 1506 (1966), repealed by Pub. L. No. 9383, 87 Stat. 207 (1978).
140. See S. REP. NO. 90-917 (1967), reprinted in 113 CONG. REC. 2886 (1967).
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Senator McClellan supported the President’s bill, agreeing that
“[p]rograms to better train and equip our police personnel are
needed.”141 He did not, however, believe that the President’s bill was
an adequate response to the rising tide of crime:
The war on crime must be waged on many fronts. . . . Court decisions that . . . protect and liberate guilty and confirmed criminals to
pursue and repeat their nefarious crimes should be reversed and
overruled.
...
. . . [N]o matter how much money we appropriate for local police
departments, we will not have effective law enforcement so long as
the courts allow self-confessed killers to go unpunished. The confusion and disarray injected into law enforcement by such decisions
as . . . Escobedo . . . and Miranda . . . are deplorable and demoralizing.142

To shore up the President’s bill, Senator McClellan introduced
what was to become Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act,
Senate Bill 917, an act devoted to govern the admissibility of evidence in federal courts.143 This bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary as a separate bill challenging the Supreme
Court’s Miranda decision by directing the federal courts to admit
confessions pursuant to the voluntariness standard.144 Pursuant to
the McClellan bill, whether a person had been advised of her rights
prior to questioning was to be considered by a court in determining
a confession’s voluntariness, but was only one of a number of factors
to be weighed.145 The proposed legislation also contained a provision
removing the Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases involving a confession’s voluntariness.146

141. 114 CONG. REC. 11,200 (1968).
142. Id. at 11,200-01.
143. Senator McClellan had introduced several anti-crime measures, several of which
were ultimately incorporated into the Omnibus package approved by Congress. See Hearings
on S. 674, S. 917, et. al., Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 2-3 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, et. al].
144. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 47 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123-24.
145. See id. at 47, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123.
146. See id.
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McClellan’s proposal, which was not without controversy, was
insufficient to appease certain senators, however, because some
members (led by Senator Sam Ervin (D-N.C.)) banded together to
cosponsor a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment:
[t]o provide that the voluntary admission of the confession of the
accused in a criminal prosecution shall be admissible against him in
any court sitting anywhere in the United States, and that the ruling
of a trial judge admitting an admission or confession as voluntarily
made shall not be reversed or otherwise disturbed by the Supreme
Court . . . if such ruling is supported by competent evidence. . . .147

Senator Ervin sponsored the amendment because, while he “favor[ed] the substance” of McClellan’s bill, he doubted whether
Congress could, by “a simple legislative enactment,” alter the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure rulings.148 The other members’ intentions are not clear. The mere fact that an amendment was proposed might suggest that at least some in Congress may have
believed that such was required to alter the Court’s decision. It is
equally possible, however, that supporters simply wanted to be
viewed as “correcting” the Court in a high profile manner.
Shortly after introducing the resolution, Senator Ervin decided
there was an even more “direct route” to “rectify the problem” created by the Supreme Court’s imaginative criminal procedure jurisprudence: simply remove the Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases involving the admissibility of confessions.149 Senator Ervin thus
introduced a bill to remove federal courts’ jurisdiction to reverse or
otherwise modify district courts’ decisions admitting voluntarily
given confessions.150 The legislation further prevented the Supreme
Court from disturbing the judgment of a state’s highest tribunal that
had declared a confession to have been made voluntarily.151Regardless, with a proposed constitutional amendment and several distinct
pieces of legislation before it, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures conducted a hearing to
evaluate the various proposals.152

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

113 CONG. REC. S628, S636-39 (1967).
Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, et. al, supra note 143, at 4.
See id. at 5.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 4.
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B. The Senate Subcommittee Hearings
Senator McClellan took the lead at the subcommittee hearings
by remarking that he was “unequivocally convinced . . . that something must be done to alleviate the baleful effects of the Supreme
Court’s 5-4 Miranda decision.”153 Senator Ervin echoed Senator
McClellan in identifying the Supreme Court’s recent criminal procedure decisions as culprits in escalating crime rates: “[T]here is no
question that these decisions have resulted in the freeing of multitudes of criminals of undoubted guilt and have unduly hampered legitimate law enforcement activities. The situation must be rectified
and the duty to do so devolves rightly upon the Congress.”154
Contrary to claims that the Senate was merely playing on crime
fears, the Committee had before it some evidence that Miranda had
adversely affected criminal law enforcement. Then Philadelphia District Attorney (now Senator) Arlen Specter revealed the startling results of a study conducted by his office to assess Miranda’s effects,
reporting that “[f]or a period after Miranda, out of 5,220 suspects
arrested for serious crimes, 3,095 refused to give a statement.”155
This translated into only “41 percent” of suspects willing to
make statements in the wake of Miranda and Escobedo, which represented a “49 percent” decrease since the latter case was decided.156
Charles E. Moylan, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore, similarly
reported “we used to get . . . [confessions] in 20 to 25 percent of
our cases, and now we are getting . . . [them] in 2 percent of our

153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 4.
155. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 42 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2128.
156. Id. Aaron Koota, the District Attorney for Kings County, New York, and Frank S.
Hogan, the New York County District Attorney, reported a similar decrease in confessions. Id.
at 42, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2128-29. The Subcommittee, of course, was not
tethered solely to the testimony presented during the hearing; the Subcommittee also gleaned
much of its information from the “mass of evidence . . . much of which is printed in the transcript of hearings.” Id. at 46, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132. In fact, the Subcommittee reported that:
Instance after instance are documented in the transcript where the most vicious
criminals have gone unpunished, even though they had voluntarily confessed their
guilt. The transcript and subcommittee files contain testimony and statements from
District attorneys, police chiefs, and other law enforcement officers in cities and
towns all over the country, demonstrating beyond doubt the devastating effect upon
the rights of society of the Miranda decision.
Id.
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cases. The confession as a law enforcement instrument has been virtually eliminated.”157
A great deal of statistical information was presented to the Subcommittee on both sides of the issue; but by far the greater weight
of testimony suggested that Miranda (and Escobedo) had seriously
hampered law enforcement efforts.158 Moreover, the Committee had
testimony demonstrating that the Court’s vision of custodial interrogation did not remotely reflect reality.159 Although it is true that the
hearing was tilted in favor of the law enforcement community, this
was in part a result of the Subcommittee’s need to collect information about Miranda’s effect on law enforcement efforts. Who better
to ask than those in the law enforcement profession? But the subcommittee did not limit itself merely to live testimony. In addition,
the Subcommittee sought letters and supplemental information from
various sources to complete the record and, with respect to the constitutionality of the Miranda warnings, had before it the testimony
of witnesses who plainly believed the warnings, or some variant
thereof, were required.
The Judiciary Committee thus attempted to fill the alleged gaps
in the earlier presidential reports by establishing a link between the
Supreme Court’s recent criminal procedure jurisprudence and the
escalation in crime rates. Testimony adduced at the hearing suggested that such a link existed. If indeed Miranda had frustrated law
enforcement efforts, the next issue was whether Congress had the
power to do anything about it.
The Subcommittee took to heart the testimony of Chief Judge J.
Edward Lumbard, of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Judge Lumbard testified that:
The legislative process is far better calculated to set standards and
rules by statute than is the process of announcing principles
through court decision in particular cases where the facts are lim157. Id. at 46, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132.
158. See generally id. at 42-47, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2128-33. Indeed,
even some commentators who suggested that the Supreme Court’s criminal decisions had little
effect upon law enforcement acknowledged the limitations of their study methodology. See,
e.g., id. at 44, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2130 (“[W]e are not prepared to say
that these decisions have not impaired the efficiency in law enforcement in areas which are at
this moment not subject to accurate measurement.”) (citation omitted).
159. District Attorney Specter testified that “the so-called third-degree method deplored
by the Supreme Court . . . is not a correct portrayal of what actually goes on in police stations
across the country.” Id. at 47-48, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2134.
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ited. The legislative process is better adapted to seeing the situation
in all its aspects and establishing a system and rules which can govern a multitude of different cases.
Judges seldom have before them all those who are the best informed regarding practical problems and the difficulties in living
with any proposed change in the law. Judges usually are advised
only by the parties in the case; the parties want to win in the case
and do not always care about general principles of wider application.
. . . [I]t is because the Congress and the legislatures of the states
have taken so little action in the field of criminal justice that the
courts have more and more chosen to lay down rules which have
the force of law until changed, and which all too frequently come
to us in the form of new constitutional principles which then can
be modified only by constitutional amendment.160

The implication, at least to some senators, was that the Supreme
Court’s pronouncements were not grounded in the constitution, but
were instead predicated on the need to establish remedies for the
violation of constitutional rights. When pointedly asked, however,
whether the Court’s invitation in Miranda, which “encourag[ed]
Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws,”161 “open[ed]
the door for legislation which would permit our avoiding the constitutional amendment process,”162 Judge Lumbard replied: “No, I
don’t think it permits you to do that.”163 However, he qualified his
denial by acknowledging that Congress could enact legislation that
was a “suitable substitute for the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court.”164 The full exchange between Judge Lumbard and
Senator McClellan respecting this point warrants consideration:
Senator McClellan: If they [a majority of the Justices] base the
Miranda decision strictly on constitutional issues, I don’t under-

160. Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, et al., supra note 143, at 184 (statement of Chief Judge
J. Edward Lumbard, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
161. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
162. Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, et al., supra note 143, at 195.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 196.
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stand how you could write a statute that did not do everything the
Court has said must be done. And if you do that, you destroy everything that you seek to attain anyhow.
Judge Lumbard: Unless you find some suitable substitute for the
requirements laid down by the Supreme Court. . .
Senator McClellan: They [a majority of the Justices] wouldn’t accept it as suitable unless it accomplished the destruction that this
decision does. They say it is based on the Constitution. I don’t
know how you can do it. They say you have got to do these things.
Well, how can you do less if the Constitution requires this be
done?165

Senator McClellan plainly grasped the important point: if the
warnings were themselves constitutionally required, Congress could
not modify them. Judge Lumbard, in contrast, appeared to suggest
that provided Congress established warnings that were a “suitable
substitute,” Congress was free to alter the Miranda warning. While
the “devil is in the details” of what constituted a suitable substitute,
the two men do not appear to have been at cross purposes in their
understanding of the Court’s decision. In responding to a question
from Senator Hugh Scott, Judge Lumbard tried to clarify his understanding of what Congress could, and could not achieve without resorting to the amendment process: “No; I don’t think [Miranda’s
language encouraging Congress to establish other procedures safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights] permits you to [overturn
Miranda without initiating the amendment process], but there certainly is a wide area which obviously the Court has not covered in its
opinion in the Miranda cases.”166 He elaborated that Congress could
legislate with respect to:
the matter of questioning before a person is in custody . . . the
manner in which the defendant or suspect is handled while he is in
custody . . . . The way in which the warning is given, the record
that is made, the presence of other people . . . these are obviously
the next questions that are going to be raised in contested cases.167

165. Id. at 196-97.
166. Id. at 195
167. Id. at 195-96
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Though the implication of Judge Lumbard’s testimony is that
some sort of warnings were constitutionally required, even he
seemed to acknowledge room for congressional action.
Judge Alexander Holtzoff’s testimony was more direct, eschewing the notion that Congress could legislatively modify the
Miranda’s warnings:
Of course, the Escobedo and Miranda cases are in a different class
[than the McNabb-Mallory line] in one important respect. They are
based on the Constitution. They hold that the Constitution requires these warnings. Therefore, it would take a constitutional
amendment, unless the Supreme Court overrules itself, whereas,
the Mallory rule being purely a procedural rule, can be changed by
legislation.168

Judge Holtzoff therefore believed that Miranda could be overruled only by constitutional amendment.
Of course, even Judge Holtzoff did not testify that Congress was
bound by the precise rules laid down by the Court, or that, even if
warnings of some sort were required, failure to follow those warnings
to the letter would necessarily demand the exclusion of otherwise
admissible evidence.
In the end, the Subcommittee maintained that Congress, better
positioned to gather a broad variety of facts, could modify the rules
established by the Court without trenching upon the Court’s constitutional theory.169 California Attorney General Thomas C. Lynch
elaborated on this understanding:
The bill under consideration sets out factors bearing on the voluntariness of confessions. If findings of fact are made by Congress
that demonstrate the relevance and importance of these factors, and
their superiority over the rules laid down in Miranda, it would
seem that the Court would have little choice but to defer to the
expert judgment of Congress. Accordingly, I consider the bill constitutional . . . .170

If, as Judge Lumbard had suggested, courts were merely filling
the gaps created by inattentive legislators, it was time for those same
elected representatives to act. And act they did.

168. Id. at 264.
169. See id.
170. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 47 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2133.
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C. The Judiciary Committee Report

Informed by the Subcommittee hearing, the Judiciary Committee ultimately abandoned the more radical path of pursuing a constitutional amendment to “discipline” the judiciary. Instead, the
Committee consolidated the Senate Bill affecting the Court’s jurisdiction and criminal procedure decisions with the House-passed
crime legislation providing financial assistance to local law enforcement into a single omnibus package. The attraction of such a package, especially in the Senate, was to link the more controversial provisions affecting the Court with the hugely popular sections
providing additional funding for state and local law enforcement.
Upon voting out the omnibus crime package, the Judiciary Committee published a lengthy report on the bill, explaining that:
[C]rime will not be effectively abated so long as criminals who have
voluntarily confessed their crimes are released on mere technicalities. The traditional right of the people to have their prosecuting
attorneys place in evidence before juries the voluntary confessions
and incriminating statements made by defendants simply must be
restored.171

In other words, Miranda’s days as an exclusive anticipatory remedy were numbered. The Committee Report cited the “rigid and inflexible requirements” established in Miranda and decried them as
“unreasonable, unrealistic, and extremely harmful to law enforcement.”172 The Committee refused to give constitutional status to the
Miranda decision. Recognizing Miranda as “an abrupt departure
from precedent extending back at least to the earliest days of the Republic,” the Report sought to return the sole test of admissibility to
one of a “totality of circumstances.”173 In the Committee’s view, the
decision’s radical break with the past could not possibly be constitutional mandate.
The Committee was not entirely dismissive of the Court’s concerns in erecting the Miranda safeguards, however. Mindful of the
need to protect individual liberties, the Report explained that the
Committee “is of the view that the [proposed] legislation . . . would
171. Id. at 37, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2123.
172. Id. at 46, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132. Numerous studies were
cited demonstrating Miranda’s harmful effect on the prosecution of crime. See id. at 39, 42,
45, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2125, 2128, 2131-32.
173. Id. at 48, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2134.
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be an effective way of protecting the rights of the individual and
would promote efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.”174 “[A]
civilized society,” the Report commented, “could not be more fair to
persons accused of crime, as the constitutional rights of defendants
in criminal cases would be fully protected and respected by the safeguards in this proposed legislation.”175 How would this be accomplished? At least in part by incorporating the Miranda warnings into
the statute itself. The Committee Report thus refused to dismiss the
warnings out of hand. Rather, those same warnings, while not dispositive, remained important indicators of a confession’s voluntariness.
The Committee, moreover, was sufficiently sanguine to recognize that “a few have expressed the view that legislation by Congress
restoring the voluntariness test to the admissibility of confessions and
incriminating statements would be declared unconstitutional, on the
ground that the provisions do not measure up to the rigid standards
set forth in Miranda.”176 Miranda’s constitutional status was thus an
issue of considerable debate. Both sides pounced upon language in
the opinion to buttress their arguments. In testifying before the Judiciary Committee, one of the original bill’s cosponsors, Senator Ervin, explained:
Although I favor the substance of [what became Title II] and
strongly feel it is preferable to the present situation, I do not believe the problem can be rectified by such a simple legislative enactment. It is true that the Miranda opinion invites legislative action on the subject of police interrogation practices. However, the
restrictions set forth in that decision and the Escobedo decision are
said to be required by the Constitution, and hence any legislative
enactment might be deemed by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional to the extent that it failed to embody rules of police conduct at least as restrictive as those favored in the Miranda and
Escobedo decisions.177

Ervin articulated what came to be the minority view: that the
Constitution required the Miranda warnings and Congress could
not dispense with them short of a constitutional amendment. Anything else, dissenters argued, risked judicial invalidation. A majority

174.
175.
176.
177.
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Id. at 51, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2137.
Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2137.
Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2137.
Hearings on S. 674, S. 970, et al., supra note 143, at 4.
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of the Committee, however, was willing to take that risk given that
four justices had dissented in Miranda and that “the overwhelming
weight of judicial opinion in this country is that the voluntariness
test does not offend the Constitution or deprive a defendant of any
constitutional right.”178 The majority believed that the warnings
simply were not constitutionally required. Exhibiting a good sense of
real politik, the Report observed that “[n]o one can predict with any
assurance what the Supreme Court might at some future date decide
if these provisions are enacted.”179 However, “the Miranda decision
itself was by a bare majority of one, and with increasing frequency
the Supreme Court has reversed itself.”180
In addition to offering its report, the Judiciary Committee took
the unusual step of including a specially prepared brief in support of
the legislation’s constitutionality.181 Although originally written to
support a provision that sought to limit federal courts’ jurisdiction in
confession cases, the Committee deemed the brief to apply equally
well to the provisions limiting Miranda.182
The supplemental brief argued that Miranda’s holding was
predicated upon the Supreme Court’s factual determination that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive and that prophylactic
warnings of some sort are thus required to mitigate against that inherent compulsion. The Committee’s brief took issue with that factual assertion, however, explaining that the Court’s finding of coerciveness was based solely upon evidence contained in police manuals
describing psychological techniques used to exploit a suspect’s weaknesses and to undermine his will to resist. The brief articulated the
position that this information was too scant to support the Court’s
adoption of specific warnings. Congress, the brief asserted, is in a
better position to gather information necessary to enact broad rules,
and as a consequence, may enact legislation adopting a contrary factual conclusion. The legislation’s purpose would be, in part, to inform the Court of its erroneous, or inadequate, factual finding that
custodial interrogation was inherently coercive. Once this erroneous
178. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 51, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2138.
179. Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2138.
180. Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2138.
181. See Brief of the Legislative Reference Service in Support of Constitutionality of Bill
Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Confession Cases, reprinted in S. REP. NO. 901097, at 53-63 (1968).
182. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 53 (1968).
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finding was corrected, the brief explained, the support for Miranda’s
prophylactic warnings would be undermined. Essentially, the brief
maintained that it was the Court’s factual finding with respect to coercion, not the Fifth Amendment, which compelled the Miranda result. The Fifth Amendment therefore did not constitute a bar to
congressional attempts to “mold constitutional policy” by “formulating a test of admissibility different from that of the court.”183 The
proposed legislation avoided any constitutional conflict because its
reaffirmation of the voluntariness standard would not “follow upon
any attempt to change constitutional theory, but rather upon a qualifying of the factual basis of that policy.”184
In support of this theory, the brief relied on Katzenbach v. Morgan,185 a case that involved the constitutionality of § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In Katzenbach, the Supreme Court upheld a
federal requirement that prohibited states from using English literacy
tests to prevent natives of Puerto Rico from voting.186 The Court
had previously acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not itself prohibit states from conditioning the eligibility to vote on
literacy tests.187 The Katzenbach Court did not reach the question of
whether New York’s literacy requirement, as applied, violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Instead, the Court upheld the federal enactment on the ground that the Court would defer to Congress’s
factual determination that § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act was an
appropriate means of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.188
The Judiciary Committee’s brief asserted that Katzenbach supported its claim because it involved a situation where the court pre183. Id. at 60, 63.
184. Id. at 63.
185. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
186. See id. at 643 (upholding § 4(e) of Voting Rights Act of 1965).
187. See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) (finding that
English language literacy requirement did not violate either Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment).
188. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 653-56. For a sampling of commentary on Congress’s
§ 5 powers, see Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5,
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1995); Stephen L. Carter,
The Morgan “Power” and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 819 (1986); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Daniel O. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39
(1995); Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L.
REV. 199 (1971).
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viously made a constitutional decision, the validity of English literacy
as a requirement for voting, on the basis both of constitutional theory and of its appraisal of the facts that led the court to conclude that
no invidious discrimination existed.189 With § 4(e), Congress did not
change the constitutional theory; rather it made its appraisal of the
facts and reached a different conclusion than the court had. Similarly,
the brief argued, the Miranda court based its decision to require
prophylactic warnings on a finding that custodial interrogation was
inherently coercive. However, in rejecting that factual finding and
substituting its own determination, Congress eliminated the need for
the Miranda warnings, but did not alter the constitutional theory
advanced by the Court.
D. The Minority Responds
The minority report, while supportive of the legislation generally,
took exception to the anti-Miranda provisions.190 Mirroring Senator
Ervin’s concerns, the minority report indicated that Miranda
touched upon fundamental constitutional issues, and thus could not
be altered by simple legislative fiat. Although acknowledging that
Congress possesses the authority to enact rules of criminal procedure, including rules governing the admissibility of confessions, the
minority report explained that Congress had no authority to overturn Supreme Court decisions interpreting basic constitutional requirements. “Congress has the power only to expand,” the minority
report intoned, “not to contract or abrogate these basic guarantees.”191 In the end, however, the Judiciary Committee voted out the
proposed legislation as part of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.192
189. See Brief of the Legislative Reference Service in Support of Constitutionality of Bill
Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Confession Cases, supra note 181, at 53-63 (1968).
190. Senators Tydings, Dodd, Hart, Long (Missouri), Kennedy (Massachusetts), Burdick, and Fong dissented from the majority’s report. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 147 (1968).
191. Id. at 150.
192. See 114 CONG. REC. S10,852 (1968). The original version of the bill as introduced
by Senator McClellen was not limited to overruling Miranda in federal prosecutions, but also
encompassed the ambitious plan of divesting federal courts of jurisdiction to review state court
decisions admitting confessions and would have further abolished federal habeas corpus review
of state judgments. See 114 CONG. REC. 11,189 (1968). Title II also contained provisions
overruling the McNabb-Mallory line of decisions and the decision in United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967), which created a right to counsel at police line-ups. These provisions
were ultimately enacted as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501(c) and 3502.

223

ONE-FIN.DOC

5/20/00 7:23 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2000

E. On the Senate Floor
The Senate engaged in roughly two weeks of debate over the
bill. The bill’s supporters focused, not unsurprisingly, on the “confusion and disarray injected into law enforcement” by Miranda.193
Floor statements make it abundantly clear that the legislation’s
object was to replace Miranda’s seemingly “absolute” requirement
with a return to the broader voluntariness standard. Senator McClellen thundered that “[i]t is time for change—time for change in the
Supreme Court of the United States. The thrust of the Miranda ruling, if it is not changed, will sweep us into the throes of anarchy and
horror.”194 While the rhetoric of the debate was certainly emotionladen,195 that should not be confused with the substance of the legislation that emerged from the Senate. Proponents of the legislation
offered an important constitutional vision by rejecting the notion
that the Court had grounded the Miranda warnings in the Fifth
Amendment. These legislators understood the Miranda Court as
merely prescribing rules governing the admission of evidence at trial,
rules that Congress could alter unilaterally.
Opponents of the bill, however, offered a competing view with
equal hyperbole. They believed that the Court had promulgated the
warnings pursuant to its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. As
such, the rules were themselves a “part” of the Fifth Amendment,
making it so Congress could not in any way alter them. Senator
Morse remarked that “[t]he Senate is kidding itself if it thinks it can
amend the Constitution or the Bill of Rights with this legislation.”196
This sentiment was echoed by Senator Tydings, who opined that
“[m]any of the provisions in title II, if not all, are little more than an
193. 114 CONG. REC. 11,201 (1968) (statement by Senator McClellan).
194. Id. at 11,206.
195. Senator Ervin, initially dubious about legislatively altering the Miranda warnings,
launched himself into efforts to enact the bill:
If you believe that the people of the United States should be ruled by a judicial oligarchy composed of five Supreme Court Justices rather than by the Constitution of
the United States, you ought to vote against title II. If you believe that selfconfessed murders, rapists, robbers, arsonists, burglars, and thieves ought to go unpunished, you ought to vote against title II. . . . [I]f you believe . . . that enough has
been done [presumably by the Supreme Court] for those who murder and rape and
rob, and that something ought to be done for those who do not wish to be murdered or raped or robbed, then you should vote for title II.
Id. at 14,155.
196. Id. at 11,595 (statement by Senator Morse).
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attempt to amend the Constitution by an act of Congress.”197 If this
statement were accurate, then even the bulk of the provision’s supporters might have voted the legislation down. In truth, this debate
reflected the larger issues surrounding the Warren Court’s expansive
reading of the Bill of Rights. While some in Congress were concerned that the Court’s newfound “activism” placed issues of considerable import outside the political sphere, others welcomed this
position.
Critics of the legislation argued that it was a “rushed” piece of
work. Senator Morse cautioned that “the bill was made pending
business yesterday, though my office was told the printed report
would not be available until the afternoon. I obtained a copy of the
text of the committee bill only in the morning.”198 Although it had
been claimed that “[f]ew Senators were familiar with the final version
of the bill before it was reported on the Senate floor,”199 the truth
was that the substance of the legislation had been the subject of a
committee hearing and report, and the Senate had engaged in
roughly two weeks of debate over the bill. For the Senate, this was
hardly “rushed” legislation. Indeed, Senator Tydings, an opponent
of the provisions designed to overturn Miranda, found sufficient
time to write to law professors throughout the country and solicit
their views with respect to the constitutionality of § 3501.200
Predictably, the 108 scholars who responded unanimously
agreed (if not uniformly on constitutional grounds) that enactment
of § 3501 was unwise.201
Moreover, the Senate did not leave the Committee’s work untouched. The bill reported out of the Judiciary Committee contained
provisions for the withdrawal of jurisdiction from the federal courts
to review state criminal cases involving confessions or eyewitness testimony and to issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners.202
197. Id. at 11,740 (statement by Senator Tydings).
198. Id. at 11,594. A Washington Post editorial similarly commented that “[a]lthough
no printed copy of the bill is yet available, its complex assortment of restraints on freedom is to
be presented to the Senate for consideration . . . . Why the hurry? . . . [S]ponsors of the bill
know it will not bear scrutiny and want to rush it to enactment while hysteria is high.” Subverting the Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1968, at A16.
199. Note, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act: A Study in Constitutional Conflict,
57 GEO. L.J. 438 (1968).
200. See 114 CONG. REC. 10,888 (1968).
201. See id.
202. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 9-10 (1967).
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Ultimately, while the bill’s supporters carried the day, they did not
succeed on every provision debated on the floor. The Senate rejected
the Committee’s jurisdiction-stripping measures and limitations on
habeas corpus.203 A majority of the Senate opposed restricting the
federal courts in this manner, approving a motion to strike this subsection by a 51-30 vote.204 While hardly conclusive, this does tend to
demonstrate that far from being a leviathan moving through the
Senate without proper consideration, the bill was subjected to serious analysis and debate. In the end, the Senate voted 72 to 4 for passage—a significant margin—and returned the bill to the House for
consideration.205
F. House Consideration
Two weeks after the Senate had passed the amended crime bill,
the House convened to consider it. Once the amended version of the
bill returned to the House for passage, the Miranda provisions,
which had not been treated in the original House version of the legislation, became a magnet for debate.206 In truth, those provisions
became the sole focus of the debate, as the House had previously
considered and passed the other portions of the bill. The original
sponsor of the House bill, Representative Emanuel Celler, condemned the Senate amendments as a “cruel hoax on citizens for
whom crime and the fear of crime are facts of life.”207 He argued that
“[a] general dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court is no basis for
striking out blindly.”208 The battle lines were thus drawn.
As had emerged during Senate consideration, both sides drew
support for their positions from the Miranda opinion’s text. It was
203. See 114 CONG. REC. S6034-45 (1968). Senator Wayne Morse (D-Or.), who opposed Title II, said of the jurisdiction-stripping proposal:
[W]e find in the bill . . . sections that withdraw jurisdiction over several of these issues from the federal courts . . . . I find these the most repugnant sections of the
whole bill. . . . [I]t smacks of a court packing scheme: When you do not like the decision, change the judges. Or when you do not like the decision, withdraw the jurisdiction.
114 CONG. REC. 11,596 (1968).
204. See id. at 14,181.
205. See 114 CONG. REC. S6292 (1968).
206. As initially passed by the House, the Omnibus Crime Bill did not contain Title II,
which was later added by the Senate and adopted at conference.
207. 114 CONG. REC. 16,066 (1968).
208. Id.
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widely recognized during floor debate that the proposed legislation
was intended to “overrule” Miranda 209 and eliminate the automatic
suppression of statements in which the interrogating officer had
failed to warn the suspects of her rights.210 No one from either side
of the debate (at least no one whose voice is heard in the record)
challenged this understanding.
Representative Rogers of Florida quoted the Supreme Court’s
invitation in Miranda to continue its search to find ways to protect
individual liberties while at the same time promoting efficient law enforcement. Representative Rogers, one of the House bill’s original
cosponsors, applauded the Senate’s decision to include the provisions
reforming Miranda.211 Others, however, such as Representative Eckhardt, while supportive of the legislation as a whole, railed against
the anti-Miranda provision, observing that it “tends to undermine
the constitutionally enunciated standards respecting the taking of
confessions, of giving constitutional warning, and of affording fifth
amendment protection.”212 However, Representative Eckhardt, mirroring the view of several members, also believed that it was better to
send the bill, flawed as it was, to the president.213
Similarly, Representative John Dow, although complaining that
the bill was “saddled with amendments that threaten our liberties
and may remain to haunt us,” nevertheless indicated that he would
vote the legislation “out of deference to so many expressions from
constituents in my district who regard protection in our streets as
their paramount anxiety today.”214
In response to the legislation’s doubters, supporters of the provision answered: “Section 3501 . . . merely returns the law . . . to what
it was for more than 175 years prior to the Escobedo and Miranda
cases.”215 Opponents rejoined, however, that “[i]nstead of carefully
reviewing decisions of the Supreme Court and amending them by
constitutional amendment where improvement is needed, the Senate

209. And Mallory and Wade as well. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, AT 38-51, reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2124-38.
210. See 114 CONG. REC. 16,274-75, 16,279, 16,280 (1968).
211. See id. at 16,274.
212. Id.
213. See id. Representative Eckhardt did note, however, that if the jurisdiction-stripping
measures had remained in the bill, “I could not have voted for it under any circumstances.” Id.
214. Id. at 16,287.
215. Id. at 16,276 (statement of Rep. Anderson).
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bill attempts in a patently unconstitutional way to set aside what the
Court has declared the Constitution to be.”216 Original sponsor and
House Judiciary Chairman Emanuel Celler warned that legislation
appearing to overturn a Supreme Court decision was destined to be
itself declared unconstitutional: “[i]t is built on false premises. Its
promises are illusory.”217 Representative Kastenmeier echoed this
sentiment when he observed that the bill “would presume to overturn three landmark supreme court [sic] cases, two of which were
decided . . . on constitutional grounds and cannot be overruled simply by legislative fiat.”218
Similarly, Congressman Schwengel expressed concern that Congress was attempting to encroach upon judicial authority by overturning Miranda.219 He plainly did not consider § 3501 sufficient to
safeguard individual rights, noting that: “If the Senate had provided
a viable alternative to the exclusionary rule so that under certain
conditions it would be possible to admit reliable evidence, even
though constitutional rights were violated, I would not be as apprehensive [of the legislation].”220 Mr. Tenzer was even more forthright
in his assessment of the legislation:
The provisions relating to the admissibility of confessions and the
admissibility of eyewitness testimony are an attempt to overrule decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court—decisions which stand as interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.
I believe that . . . the U.S. Supreme Court will find this section of
the crime bill unconstitutional. The Congress does not have the authority to overrule the Supreme Court in this manner.221

The House also debated the factual assertions underpinning the
provisions altering Miranda. Representative Fraser, for example,
took issue with the data presented to the Senate that the number of
confessions had fallen since Miranda. “How then,” he asked, “could
216. Id. at 16,280 (statement of Rep. Reuss).
217. Id. at 16,066.
218. Id. at 16,284.
219. See id. at 16,289.
220. Id.
221. Id. Congressman Reid of New York offered a similar assessment of the bill’s constitutionality, noting that “[t]he provisions . . . have been declared of dubious constitutionality
by the deans and constitutional law professors of nearly every leading law school in the nation.” Id. at 16,295.
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an elimination of the sanctions for the failure of police to observe
correct procedures lead to an increase in confessions unless increased
numbers of confessions were to flow from such failures on the part of
the police? Is that the aim of this legislation . . . to encourage abuses
of procedures in order to increase the number of confessions?”222
The bill’s defenders, however, pointed out that “ample safeguards” existed because the judge reviewing the confession’s voluntariness is required to review all the circumstances surrounding the
confession, including whether warnings were given.223 Representative
Pollock observed that the modifications to Miranda “do not give
rise to a denial of constitutional or substantive rights, but rather attack the particular procedural limitations which the Court has chosen
to impose.”224
Representative Machen further explained that the Court’s decisions were illegitimate because it was “engaged in making law, not
merely interpreting it.”225 His concern was that the Court, however
noble its purposes, had “pretend[ed] . . . that each of its decisions
was an interpretation of an existing law” rather than a new creation.226 This effort undermined the separation of powers and threatened traditional legislative authority. In the end, the House debate
informed those present of the significant issues of constitutional import addressed by the legislation. The issues, by and large, appear to
have been widely understood and fed into a larger debate that had
been percolating for some time: whether it was appropriate for the
Court to reinterpret the Constitution so as to “create” rights generally acknowledged not to have previously existed. Some opponents
of the bill sought to have it sent to a House-Senate conference
committee, where they hoped the offending provisions could be removed. By sad historical coincidence, however, the legislation was
returned to the House while the country was mourning Senator
Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination. Although the House vigorously
debated the bill on the floor, it took the somewhat unusual step of
passing the Senate bill as presented and forgoing a joint confer-

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 16,293.
See id. at 16,296 (statement of Rep. Randall).
Id. at 16,298.
Id. at 16,285.
Id.
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ence.227 Some cynically expressed that Senator Kennedy’s assassination was being exploited by those supporting the statute to ensure its
passage. However, while Representative Ryan believed it “highly inappropriate for the House to use the time of the tragic murder of
Senator Robert Kennedy as the occasion to enact an unwise measure” and “question[ed] whether we should be legislating at all on
this dark day,”228 the will of the House was otherwise.
G. What did Congress Do?
The foregoing discussion is not an attempt to “divine” any sort
of legislative intent with respect to the statute. It is exceedingly difficult to determine the “intent” of any large, deliberative body. These
snippets of the congressional debate are reported to demonstrate
that, far from being rushed through Congress without the opportunity to debate its provisions, § 3501 was actually the product of considerable debate and significant modification. Regardless of the political winds favoring its enactment, the best evidence of any
“legislative intent” is that the legislation was enacted by a substantial
margin on the vote of individuals who had been exposed to the relevant constitutional arguments. Often lost in the debate over § 3501
is what Congress actually achieved with the legislation. Far too often,
the statute is merely dismissed as “overruling Miranda” without paying much attention to the statutory text.229 While perhaps some of
this criticism can be attributed to the inflated rhetoric during the
floor debate, it is important to read the statute to see what Congress
enacted. While it is true that Congress replaced the “rigid requirements” of Miranda, it is interesting to observe that the legislation
did so in a balanced and reasonable way.
Professor Yale Kamisar has offered the view that § 3501 merely
“repeal[s]” Miranda and, far from establishing a system equally protective of suspects’ rights, instead simply “reinstat[es] the due process ‘totality of the circumstances’–‘voluntariness’ test for the admis-

227. The House voted 317 to 60 against sending the bill to conference, and 368 to 17
for final passage. See id.
228. Id. at 16,294.
229. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 76 (2d ed.,
1982) (“It is one thing to devise alternative safeguards and quite another to provide, as the
1968 legislation does, that no safeguards are needed.”); Recent Statute: Title II of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1392, 1396 (1969).
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sibility of confessions.”230 As Kamisar has further explained, the Supreme Court recognized this previous test as flawed and thus had replaced it with the Miranda safeguards.231 However, as has been exhaustively detailed elsewhere, § 3501 in several important respects
goes well beyond the pre-Miranda voluntariness test.232 One commentator has noted, “parts of [§ 3501] would have been a progressive expansion of suspects’ rights if Congress had passed it prior to
Miranda.”233
For example, § 3501(a) codifies the so-called Jackson v. Denno 234
hearing and requires that while the judge must admit voluntary confessions, she “shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.”235
Such an instruction permits the defendant to place the confession
within its proper context and to seek mitigation from the jury. The
statute also codifies the basic Miranda warnings, which were not
mandated prior to the decision, and specifically directs the trial court
to consider whether the warnings were given.236 Congress thus took
into account the testimony of hearing witnesses who indicated that
warnings of some sort were required.
Section 3501(b)(2) requires the suppression judge to consider
whether the “defendant knew of the nature of the offense with

230. Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA
L.J. 465, 469 (1999).
231. See id. at 471-72.
232. See Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT.
REV. 81, 129 (observing that § 3501 “does not wholly sweep aside Miranda” and stating that
“the legislative enumeration of factors arguably gives them a special status . . . that did not
necessarily obtain” before Miranda).
233. FRED GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 324 (1970).
234. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1999).
236. See id. Under Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968), the results under the
statute or the voluntariness test may be similar. In Greenwald, the police questioned the defendant for about an hour one evening and for fewer than four hours the next morning before he
confessed. See Greenwald, 390 U.S. at 519-20. He had not received Miranda warnings but
apparently had actual knowledge of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. See id. at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Despite his knowledge, the Court held that the absence of the warnings was strongly probative of involuntariness and that the defendant’s confession was inadmissible under traditional standards. See id. at 521. The case had gone to trial
before Miranda had been decided. Because the Court found the concession involuntary under
the “totality of the circumstances” test, it did not have to apply Miranda to find the confession
inadmissible. Id. at 521 n.*. Several other factors, such as the defendant’s physical condition,
were also used to find involuntariness. Id. at 522.
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which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of
the confession.”237 This requirement goes not only beyond the law as
it existed at the time Miranda was decided, but also extends current
practice in which the Supreme Court has held that failure of the police to inform a suspect “of the subject matter of the interrogation
could not affect [the defendant’s] decision to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege in a constitutionally significant manner.”238
Section 3501(b)(3) is also considerably broader than preMiranda law in acknowledging a suspect’s right to remain silent during police questioning and “whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and
that any such statement could be used against him.”239 Though
anathema to law enforcement officers, the statute also both recognizes a statutory right to counsel and makes it relevant whether a
suspect was advised of his rights and whether he “was without the
assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.”240 Before Miranda, no general right to assistance of counsel
existed during police interrogation. While the absence of any of the
factors “need not be conclusive” on the issue of admissibility, the
Court is free to read the statute as requiring courts to give “strong
consideration” to the absence of warnings as a factor suggesting a
confession was obtained involuntarily.241
Essentially, Congress not only took the Supreme Court’s admonitions in Miranda to heart, but sought to incorporate them in a
reasonable, balanced fashion. Thus, the Miranda warnings would be
preferred, and would be statutorily made a part of the “totality of the
circumstances” evaluation, but no single item would be given presumptively greater weight. Congress did not merely toss out
Miranda, instead it engaged in a reasoned legislative approach to
craft procedural requirements that balanced the need for efficient law
enforcement against a suspect’s constitutional rights. The balance
was struck, not solely through the lens of a single case, but after
hearing testimony from numerous interested parties and engaging in
considerable debate. Congress thus provided suspects with greater

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
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18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(2) (1999).
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987).
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(3).
Id.
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protection than they enjoyed prior to Miranda, while simultaneously
not entirely tying the hands of police.
H. On to the President
On signing the Crime Control Act242 into law on June 19, 1968,
President Lyndon Johnson remarked that “[t]he provisions of Title
II, vague and ambiguous as they are, can, I am advised by the Attorney General, be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.”243
And so it was accomplished. Miranda was undone.
V. LITIGATING § 3501
Or was it? One would think that prosecutors, armed with a federal statute enacted largely for their benefit, would lead an all-out assault on Miranda. After all, despite certain misgivings, President
Johnson had signed legislation teeing up a potential conflict between
the Court and Congress. The anticipated battle didn’t take place

242. The legislation ultimately presented to the president contained two important subsections. Subsection (a) provided that “in any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States or by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given.” 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1999). Simple enough. It was subsection (b) that
posed the problem for Miranda afficionados: it provided that courts, in determining voluntariness,
shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment,
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was
charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3)
whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to
make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4)
whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to
the assistance of counsel, and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of
the confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1999).
243. Transcript of Johnson’s Statement on Signing Crime and Safety Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1968, at 23; see also Statement of the President Upon Signing the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, 4 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 983 (June 24, 1968) [hereinafter Statement by
the President].
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until over thirty years later, however.244 In the sections that follow, I
will trace § 3501’s tortured litigation history.
A. The Johnson Administration: An Undeclared War On The Statute
Much like Goldilocks’s search for the perfect porridge, prosecutors have long struggled to unearth just the “right” case in which to
test § 3501’s constitutionality. In part, this may have been a result of
President Johnson’s antipathy towards the legislation. Although he
had written to Senator Mike Mansfield and urged him to shepherd
passage of the bill’s gun control and law enforcement block grant
provisions, he requested that the Senator “not encumber the legislation with provisions [i.e., the section overturning Miranda] raising
grave constitutional questions.”245 To avoid these questions, President Johnson announced that he would direct the FBI to continue
its practice of informing suspects of their rights—a policy pre-dating
Miranda itself.246 Attorney General Ramsey Clark took this directive
even further, instructing federal prosecutors to offer into evidence

244. It is important to differentiate the different aspects of § 3501. Although the focus of
this paper and recent efforts to enforce § 3501 involve the statute’s effect on Miranda, the
statute has other consequences as well. For example, § 3501 sought to overturn Escobedo and
United States v. Wade (which involved precedent from McNabb-Mallory and Massiah v. United
States), and possibly Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The courts generally
determined that Congress’s decision to re-write the rules governing pre-arraignment delay did
not pose a constitutional problem, because those rules were based upon Rule 5 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405-06 (9th
Cir. 1985) (citing § 3501 as applied to preindictment delay); United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d
1026, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir.
1972) (presuming constitutionality of § 3501 as applied to preindictment delay), rev’d, 412
U.S. 205 (1973); United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68, 75 (10th Cir. 1972) (invoking
§ 3501 in considering preindictment delay); United States v. Evans, 1995 WL 254422, at *1*2 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 17, 1995); United States v. Wilbon, 911 F. Supp. 1420, 1425 (D.N.M.
1995); United States v. Eltayib, 808 F. Supp. 160, 162-63 (E.D.N.Y 1992) (pre-arraignment
delay); Velasco v. United States, No. CV-91-2743, 1992 WL 135029, at *6-*7 (E.D.N.Y.
May 28, 1992) (same). But see United States v. Poole, 495 F.2d 115, 133 & n.13 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Fahy, J., dissenting) (“In my view these are serious questions whether section 3501 can
be sustained as a modification of the Mallory rule—questions of constitutional substance as
indicated by the Miranda reference to the Rule.”).
245. President’s Letter to the Majority Leader of the Senate Regarding the Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 12,450 (1968) (statement of Senator Mansfield).
246. See Statement of the President, supra note 243, at 727.
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only those confessions obtained in accordance with Miranda.247 To
the extent prosecutors adhered to this policy, it would be difficult to
test the statute.
As a result, few early cases exist in which prosecutors litigated the
salient provisions of § 3501.248 Even in cases where prosecutors
chose to invoke the statute, courts found it either inapplicable or
simply beside the point, since Miranda warnings had been given. In
an early test of the statute, for example, the government relied on
§ 3501(d) for the modest proposition that “Miranda . . . should not
be applied to non-custodial interrogations.”249 This was hardly an extreme position. The district court nevertheless rejected that argument, explaining the defendant was plainly in custody and “underwent extensive interrogation.”250 The court also found it significant
that the defendant was neither apprized of his rights nor informed of
the nature of the investigation.251 As a consequence, the court concluded: “it cannot be said that [the defendant’s] statements . . . was
[sic] voluntary or that he knowledgeably waived his rights.”252 “Yet,”
the court explained, relying upon Miranda, “this is precisely what
the Constitution requires.”253 Typical of these early cases, the court
failed to consider the issue of whether § 3501 supplanted Miranda
because the government had made no such assertion. The court
could well have considered the § 3501 issue sua sponte, but refused
to do so.
A similar refrain is heard in Reinke v. United States,254 in which
the Ninth Circuit declined to reach the issue of § 3501’s constitutionality, explaining “the trial in this case had already been completed when this statute was passed, and the Government in its brief
concedes that the statute should have prospective application

247. See Daniel Gandara, Admissibility of Confessions in Federal Prosecutions: Implementation of Section 3501 by Law Enforcement Officials and the Courts, 63 GEO. L.J. 305, 311-12
(1974).
248. In reconstructing § 3501’s litigation history, I focus only on those cases either officially reported or available through online research services. It is entirely possible, indeed likely,
but difficult to unearth, unreported cases in which prosecutors raised § 3501.
249. United States v. Dickerson, 291 F. Supp. 633, 637 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
250. Id.
251. See id. at 638.
252. Id. at 637.
253. Id.
254. 405 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1968).

235

ONE-FIN.DOC

5/20/00 7:23 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2000

only.”255 As was to become typical of cases raising § 3501, the court
observed that “the [defendant] was given the Miranda warnings, so
the Government need not rely on the more relaxed procedures of
section 701.”256 Little else of note involving § 3501 occurred during
the Johnson Administration, probably because of Attorney General
Clark’s instructions to federal prosecutors.257
B. The Nixon Administration: Benign Neglect
The prospect that § 3501 would have its day in court brightened
considerably in anticipation of the Nixon Administration. After all,
Candidate Nixon had lambasted Miranda as having “the effect of
seriously hamstringing [sic] the peace forces in our society and
strengthening the criminal forces.”258 It was thus not unreasonable
to assume that once elected, tough-on-crime President Nixon would
enforce § 3501. Despite his campaign rhetoric, however, Nixon pursued a somewhat more cautious route in challenging Miranda. His
Attorney General, John Mitchell, directed federal prosecutors and
law enforcement officers to abide by the Miranda rules.Although
this directive appeared to be a continuation of the Johnson Administration’s policy, it differed in at least two important respects. First,
in contrast to Attorney General Clark, Attorney General Mitchell
furnished prosecutors with some wiggle room to invoke § 3501 by
indicating that prosecutors could raise the statute where only a minor deviation from Miranda’s requirements occurred, such as
“where an agent inadvertently fails to fully explain the right to have
counsel appointed for an indigent, or a written waiver is not obtained.”259 Thus, in the event of such an insignificant Miranda viola-

255. Id. at 230.
256. Id.
257. See Fred Graham, Federal Lawyers Seeking to Soften Confession Curb, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 1969, at 22 (reporting that Clark instructed prosecutors to offer evidence only in
compliance with Miranda).
258. Richard M. Nixon, Toward Freedom from Fear (May 8, 1968) (position paper on
crime), reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 12,936-38 (1968); see also BAKER, supra note 72, at 248
(detailing Nixon Campaign speeches criticizing Miranda).
259. United States Department of Justice, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 to the United States Attorneys, Memorandum No. 584, Supp. 3 (June 11,
1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. 23,236, Memorandum No. 584, Supp. 3 (1969). The
Memorandum continued:
Aside from any constitutional issues, therefore, it is impossible to predict how much
weight a particular court will give to the absence of any one of the factors men-
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tion, prosecutors could seek admission of the confession pursuant to
§ 3501. In truth, this represented a fairly small divergence from the
policy articulated by his predecessor. A careful reading of Mitchell’s
directive reveals that agents were still required to provide criminal
suspects with full Miranda warnings. Only in those narrow instances
in which a technical violation occurred would prosecutors be permitted to invoke § 3501. The Department never satisfactorily clarified
what constituted a “technical violation,” however, making it unlikely
that prosecutors would employ the statute.
Second, while the Johnson Administration had serious qualms
about § 3501’s constitutionality, the Nixon Justice Department took
the position that § 3501 was constitutional. In explaining the Department’s § 3501 policy to the House Select Committee on Crime,
Attorney General Mitchell testified that “[i]t is our feeling . . . that
the Congress has provided this legislation, and, until such time as we
are advised by the courts that it does not meet constitutional standards, we should use it.”260
Despite the Nixon Administration’s support of the statute, the
Justice Department apparently did not develop a coordinated strategy to implement the statute. Instead, individual field prosecutors
apparently sought to invoke § 3501 in select cases. Courts were thus
forced to take notice of the statute. However, although prosecutors
seemingly attempted to raise the statute, it appears the occasion to
litigate the constitutional status of § 3501 did not arise. This is in
large part due to the fact that federal agents, in compliance with the
Justice Department’s long-held policy, continued to provide suspects
with Miranda warnings.261
tioned. For this reason, the only safe course for federal investigative agents, and for
such United States Attorneys as may have occasion to talk with defendants, is to
continue their present practice of giving the full Miranda warnings.
The area where we believe the statute can be effective and where a legitimate
constitutional argument can be made is the situation where a voluntary confession is
obtained after a less than perfect warning or a less than conclusive waiver . . . .
Id.
260. The Improvement and Reform of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the
United States: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Crime, 91st Cong. 250 (1969)
(statement of Attorney General John Mitchell).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., concurring); Ailsworth v. United
States, 448 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 377 (2d
Cir. 1970); Gandara, supra note 247.
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Certain opportunities did, however, present themselves. The first
opening to enforce § 3501 presented itself in the Virgin Islands. In
Virgin Islands v. Williams,262 the government sought to introduce a
confession taken in violation of Miranda. In support of the confession’s admissibility, the government offered two arguments. First, it
claimed that Miranda had not been offended. In the alternative, the
government argued that § 3501 would permit the statement’s admission because a Miranda violation constituted but one of the
grounds governing a statement’s admission. In applying the totality
of the circumstances test, the government asserted that the confession should have been admitted regardless of any minor Miranda
trespass.263
The district court, however, declined to consider the § 3501 argument. The court explained that as this case arose in the Virgin Islands, the statute could not be enforced unless the court of appeals,
using its supervisory authority, so held.264 As the court of appeals had
yet to pass on the matter, the district court determined that the appellate court’s “jealous concern for the rights of persons accused of
crime” would likely not lead it “to exercise its supervisory powers
and make applicable to Virgin Islands prosecutions the provisions” of
§ 3501.265
While this refusal to address § 3501’s constitutional status was
not altogether uncommon, one provision of the statute—subsection
(c), which involved pre-arraignment delay—did not go unnoticed
during the Nixon Administration. In United States v. Halbert,266 for
example, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government’s interlocutory
appeal of the district court’s decision to suppress the defendant’s
confession.267 The district court, in a case of first impression, had
concluded that state police officers’ failure to timely present the defendant before a magistrate violated § 3501(c), which requires law
enforcement officers to bring a suspect before a judicial officer within
six hours of “arrest or other detention.”268 Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly construe the Miranda provision of § 3501, it
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
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306 F. Supp. 1104 (D.V.I. 1969).
See id. at 1105.
See id. at 1106.
Id.
436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970).
See id. at 1227.
Id. at 1229.
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did explore the statute’s legislative history and noted the constitutional issue presented therein.269 Consequently, of all the statute’s
provisions, the subsection involving pre-arraignment delay was the
only one squarely to be addressed (and upheld).270
Oddly, in two of the earliest (reported) mentions of § 3501, the
defendants invoked the statute. This is perhaps not entirely surprising
because defendants gained certain benefits that they did not enjoy in
the pre-Miranda world. In Sheer v. United States,271 for example, the
defendant raised the statute to argue that the district court had failed
to hold a “voluntariness” hearing as § 3501 requires.272 The court of
appeals rejected that claim, however, explaining that the statute
could not retroactively be applied to the defendant’s case.273
Similarly, in United States v. White,274 the defendant “assert[ed]
the novel proposition that the government’s right to introduce evidence . . . is even more narrowly circumscribed by the requirements
for voluntariness of ‘confessions’ under 18 U.S.C. § 3501.”275
“From this,” the court explained, the defendant “argue[d] that disclosures and evidence sufficiently voluntary to be admissible under
Miranda nevertheless may be involuntary as a matter of law under
[§ 3501].”276 The court dismissed that contention, however, observing that “neither the language of § 3501 nor its legislative history
indicate that Congress intended to expand the protection of potential criminal defendants beyond the scope of protection established
by the Miranda line of cases.”277
Prosecutors doubtless pressed the § 3501 issue in other cases,
but apparently without much success. A number of cases during that
time period note, without resolving, the potential constitutional conflict between § 3501 and Miranda.278 By and large, the courts ap269. See id. at 1231-37.
270. See id. at 1237.
271. 414 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1969).
272. See id. at 125.
273. See id.
274. 417 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1969).
275. Id. at 91.
276. Id. at 92.
277. Id. at 91-92.
278. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 796 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining
“[w]e do not decide whether section 3501 intended to overrule Miranda or would be constitutional if it did”) (citations omitted); United States v. Davis, 456 F.2d 1192, 1195 (10th Cir.
1972) (noting that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality
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peared to be cognizant of the issue, but generally declined to consider it either because it was not raised or not quite on point. Contrary to having a dramatic impact on law enforcement, the statute
was reduced to something of a fringe issue from the start. Like any
policy not pursued with vigor and tended with care, § 3501 began to
wither.
C. The Ford Administration: Encouraging Signs on the Enforcement
Front
The Ford Administration’s position with respect to § 3501
largely reflected that of its immediate predecessor. Early in the administration, the Justice Department reiterated its position that the
policies of the Mitchell directive “are still considered current and applicable.”279 As before, the Justice Department took the position that
the statute was constitutional.280
Career prosecutors invoked the statute in what was doubtless the
most significant § 3501 case to be litigated until Dickerson: United
States v. Crocker.281 In Crocker, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district
court’s decision that § 3501 was valid and that, for a confession to
be admissible, perfect compliance with Miranda was unnecessary.282
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Michigan v. Tucker,283 “although not involving the provisions of
section 3501, did, in effect, adopt and uphold the constitutionality
of the provisions thereof.”284 Accordingly, the court concluded that
“the trial court did not err in applying the guidelines of § 3501 . . .
in determining the issue of the voluntariness of Crocker’s confession.”285 Oddly, however, the court went on to find that there was

of these provisions [§ 3501]”); United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Friendly, J., concurring); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553, 574 n.18. (D.C. Cir.
1970) (McGowen, J., dissenting) (observing that § 3501 “is subject to grave constitutional
doubts” but notes that its effect on Miranda is not raised in this case).
279. Gandara, supra note 247, at 312 n.45 (quoting Letter from the Department of Justice to Daniel Gandara (May 15, 1974)) (on file with the Georgetown Law Journal).
280. See id.
281. 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
282. See id. at 1138.
283. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
284. Crocker, 510 F.2d at 1137 (citation omitted).
285. Id. at 1138.
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“full compliance with the Miranda mandates,” implying that its discussion of § 3501 was dicta.286
Crocker, far from being a lightening rod, neither took firm hold
in the Tenth Circuit nor did it engender similar litigation in other
circuits. One would think that in light of Crocker, the Tenth Circuit
would have been inundated with cases relying upon § 3501. That is
simply not the case, however. While a number of Tenth Circuit cases
favorably cite § 3501 and Crocker,287 none relied upon the statute to
trump Miranda until United States v. Rivas-Lopez surfaced in
1997.288
In most cases, federal agents continued to give Miranda warnings. Hence, challenges involving § 3501 generally did not concern a
question of admitting an un-Mirandized statement, but rather some
larger issue of voluntariness.289 The Ninth Circuit, for example,
noted in United States v. Gegax 290 that § 3501 directed trial courts
“to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the giving of a
confession . . . without regarding any as conclusive.”291 As a result,
the court refused to overturn a district court’s denial of a suppression
motion where the only claim was that the government failed to repeat the Miranda warnings it had given some thirty minutes earlier.292 Once again, however, it is difficult to determine whether the
court viewed the statue as supplanting Miranda because federal

286. Id.
287. See, e.g., United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1583 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 462 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Miller, 987 F.2d 1462,
1464 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 1552 (10th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Benally, 756 F.2d
773, 775-76 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 666-67 (10th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Fritz, 580 F.2d 370, 378 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shoemaker, 542
F.2d 561, 563 (10th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211, 121718 (10th Cir. 1978) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
288. See infra Part V.G. Interestingly, in United States v. Duncan, 857 F. Supp. 852 (D.
Utah 1994), the district court both notes that § 3501(c) has “supplanted” the McNabbMallory rule, id. at 860, and observes that “Miranda is not a constitutional right.” Id. at 859
n.7 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984)). This case perhaps demonstrated the District of Utah’s openness to considering
§ 3501 for the purpose of replacing Miranda.
289. See United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976) (relying on § 3501 to
assess the voluntariness of Mirandized statements).
290. 506 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1974).
291. Id. at 461.
292. See id.
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agents had read the defendant his rights and had claimed that no
Miranda violation had occurred.
D. The Carter Administration: The Statute Goes Missing
During the Carter Administration, § 3501 was all but a nonissue. Although references to the statute appear frequently in reported cases, it appears that for the most part courts sought to harmonize § 3501 and Miranda. In United States v. Vigo,293 for example, the district court, although relying on the voluntariness factors
articulated in § 3501(b), nevertheless explained that
[g]iven the importance the Supreme Court attached to the
[Miranda] warning . . . this court will not assume that Congress intended to authorize the admission of confessions where this warning is not given, at least in the absence of strong evidence that the
defendant was otherwise aware of the consequences of waiving the
privilege.294

Of course, had the district court read the statute or paid any heed to
the congressional debate, it would have understood that Congress
had intended to do just that. Instead, the court held that the failure
of the agents to warn the suspect of his rights, coupled with a lack of
counsel and no evidence that the defendant otherwise understood
his rights, meant the confession would need to be suppressed.295
Similarly, in United States v. Crook,296 the Third Circuit stated
that “[w]e cannot . . . disregard the congressional mandate of 18
U.S.C. [§] 3501(a).”297 The court nevertheless noted that
“[p]resumably, the constitutionally mandated requirements of the
Miranda decision survive that enactment” and refused to use the
statute to negate Miranda.298

293. 357 F. Supp. 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also, United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295,
299 (2d Cir. 1973) (declining to determine the constitutionality of § 3501); Ailsworth v.
United States, 448 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1971) (same); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL
INTERROGATION, 73 & n.113 (1986) (stating that in most instances, including Vigo, the
courts “either found it unnecessary to address” the constitutionality of § 3501 “or side-stepped
the issue in some other way”) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY].
294. Vigo, 357 F. Supp. at 1366.
295. See id.
296. 502 F.2d 1378 (3d Cir. 1974).
297. Id. at 1381.
298. Id.
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The only reported instance of a judge questioning Miranda’s supremacy occurred, predictably, in the Tenth Circuit. In United States
v. DiGiacomo,299 the Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit wrote in dissent:
The Supreme Court has not been called upon to rule on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b). To be sure, the Supreme Court
is the final and ultimate arbiter of any constitutional issue raised involving its applicability. That, however, is no reason for this court
to “bury its head in the sand” in avoidance of the provisions of
§ 3501 . . . .
The Congress, in obvious recognition of society’s needs in the area
of effective administration of the criminal justice system, enacted
§ 3501, . . . in order to vitalize the “totality of the circumstances”
rule which, in my judgment, is both common sensed and fair. It
does not abolish the Miranda guidelines, but instead it places them
in proper focus based upon the totality of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession or admission against one’s
Fifth Amendment interest. It avoids a mechanical, unrealistic application of Miranda.300

Quoting Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Brewer v. Williams, the
dissenting Tenth Circuit judge continued:
[I]n cases where incriminating disclosures are voluntarily made
without coercion, and hence not violative of the Fifth Amendment,
but are obtained in violation of one of the Miranda prophylaxes,
suppression is no longer automatic. Rather, we weigh the deterrent
effect on unlawful police conduct, together with the normative
Fifth Amendment justifications for suppression, against “the strong
interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier
of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce” . . . .301

Despite these strong words from the court’s chief judge and the
precedent established in Crocker, the Tenth Circuit did not revisit
the § 3501 issue until considerably later. Neither did prosecutors
litigating in the Tenth Circuit appear to exploit the earlier decision.

299. 579 F.2d 1211, 1219 (10th Cir. 1978) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 1219.
301. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d at 1219 (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974))).
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E. The Reagan Administration: A Near Rebirth?
It was not until the Reagan Administration that the Justice Department contemplated mounting a coherent strategy to implement
§ 3501.302 The Department’s Office of Legal Policy prepared a report for Attorney General Edwin Meese arguing that federal prosecutors should “seek to persuade the Supreme Court to abrogate or
overrule the decision in Miranda v. Arizona” by relying on
§ 3501.303 As a result of this report, “the Attorney General approved
this view of the constitutionality of the statute and instructed the
litigating divisions to seek out the best test case” to overturn
Miranda.304
Prosecutors apparently had a difficult time unearthing just such a
case, as there are but few examples of Reagan-era prosecutors using
§ 3501 to gain the admission of un-Mirandized confessions. In fact,
only one case stands out: in United States v. Goudreau,305 the Civil
Rights Division relied on the statute to gain the admission of an errant officer’s statement in a police brutality prosecution.306 The government argued that “under the terms of 18 U.S.C. [§] 3501, the
defendant’s statement is admissible evidence regardless of whether
Miranda warnings were required, because the statement was voluntarily made.”307 Although the district court rejected the government’s argument and suppressed the defendant’s statements, the
Eighth Circuit reversed.308 The Eighth Circuit’s opinion, however,
did not cite § 3501 and instead ruled that federal officers had complied with Miranda.309
Similarly, in United States v. Caputo,310 the government argued
that, pursuant to § 3501, the district court could not suppress the
defendants’ statements if they were voluntary—even if taken in viola-

302. Professor Paul Cassell has detailed efforts of the Reagan Justice Department to enforce the statute. See Paul Cassell, supra note 72, at 200-02 and accompanying text.
303. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 293, at 96.
304. Cassell, supra note 72, at 201.
305. 854 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988).
306. See Brief for the United States at 19, United States v. Goudreau, 854 F.2d 1097
(8th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5403).
307. Id. (citing United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
308. See Goudreau, 854 F.2d at 1099.
309. See id. at 1098.
310. 641 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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tion of Miranda.311 The district court, however, declined to address
the government’s argument because it deemed the statements to
have been made in a non-interrogation setting and thus refused to
apply § 3501.312
A defendant again raised § 3501 in United States v. Abell,313
claiming that it required a more stringent definition of voluntariness.314 Without addressing the constitutionality of the statute, the
district court concluded that, whatever its status, § 3501 did not expand the traditional Townsend v. Sain315 test.316 If anything, the court
opined, § 3501 was intended to narrow the circumstances in which a
confession could be excluded.317
F. The Bush Administration: Continued Search for a Test Case
The Bush Administration, although not perhaps as aggressively,
continued the policies of the Reagan Justice Department with respect to § 3501. Some years after leaving office, Attorney General
William Barr explained in a letter to Congress that the Bush Justice
Department “took the position that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was constitutional as an exercise of Congress’s authority to control the admission
of evidence before federal courts.”318 Attorney General Barr also
stated that he had instructed one of his special assistants to find an
appropriate case in which to raise the statute.319
Prosecutors apparently were again frustrated in their efforts to
find the right case, as no important litigation occurred during this
period. The most significant reported case during the Bush Administration was United States v. Bordeaux,320 in which the court cited
§ 3501 for the proposition that in determining whether a confession
was involuntary, the court was required to consider “‘all the circum311. See id. at 381.
312. See id.
313. 586 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Me. 1984).
314. See id. at 1422.
315. 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 540 U.S. 1
(1992).
316. See Abell, 586 F. Supp. at 1423. Sain held that for a statement to be voluntary, it
must be “the product of a rational intellect and a free will.” Sain, 372 U.S. at 307.
317. See Abell, 586 F. Supp. at 1423.
318. Letter from Attorney General William P. Barr to Senator Strom Thurmond (May
12, 1999) (on file with author).
319. Id.
320. 980 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1992).
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stances surrounding the giving of the confession, including the factors specifically listed in [§ 3501].’”321 As the Miranda warnings had
been given in that case, however, it is difficult to determine whether
the court would have relied on § 3501 in Miranda’s stead.322 The
statute thus remained something of a dead letter.
G. The Clinton Administration: Miranda Unraveled?
Curiously, much of the litigation surrounding § 3501 has occurred during the Clinton Administration. That administration initially adopted, by inertia, the policy of its predecessors—a sort of
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy applied to a congressional statute.
However, the Administration was not able to successfully hide behind this policy because outside sources took up the cudgel. The
Clinton Administration was thus forced to take a position on the
statute—one that broke with past presidential administrations, if not
quite in practice, then surely in theory.
Unfortunately, the Clinton Justice Department got off to something of a rocky start. In United States v. Cheely,323 postal inspectors
obtained voluntary, incriminating statements from a defendant who
had sent a mail bomb to a witness instrumental in testifying against
him in an earlier murder conviction.324 The district court, however,
had suppressed the statements based upon a technical Miranda violation.325 In light of the crime’s severity and the importance of the
defendant’s confession, the government decided to appeal the district court’s suppression order.
An internal Justice Department memorandum to the Solicitor
General advised raising § 3501 as one of the four grounds on which
to base an appeal.326 The memorandum noted that, in the author’s
understanding, the Justice Department “[had] made arguments

321. Id. at 538-39 (quoting United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1228 (8th Cir.
1990)).
322. Similarly, the district court in United States v. Carstens noted the government’s burden of demonstrating voluntariness, but did not address the constitutional issue because the
defendant had consulted with counsel before talking to the agents. United States v. Carstens,
747 F. Supp. 528, 531 (N.D. Iowa 1989).
323. 21 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1994).
324. See id. at 921-22.
325. See United States v. Cheely, 814 F. Supp. 1447, 1448-49 (D. Alaska 1992).
326. See Memorandum to the Solicitor General (Mar. 12, 1993) (citing Dep’t of Justice
Doc.) (on file with author).
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based on § 3501 to courts of appeals in the past.”327 In any case, Justice Department attorneys authorized an appeal on the basis of
§ 3501, but after the intervention of political appointees, and by the
time the brief was filed, the § 3501 claim was reduced to little more
than a token argument.328 In the end, the government’s brief made
only a passing reference to § 3501 without fully exploring the issue.329 The Ninth Circuit upheld the suppression of Cheely’s statements, but issued an order requesting briefing on the question of
whether the issue merited en banc rehearing.330 The government,
however, opposed further review of the decision.331
United States v. Sullivan332 presented another significant opportunity for the government to litigate § 3501. In Sullivan, officers
made a routine vehicle stop of Sullivan, a felon, and discovered a
firearm.333 The government indicted Sullivan for being a felon in
possession of a firearm, but, during the subsequent trial, the court
suppressed his incriminating statement on the ground that the arresting officer had not informed Sullivan of his rights.334 In its suppression order, however, the court questioned whether the mechanical
application of the exclusionary rule should remain the law.335
The U.S. Attorney’s office subsequently invoked § 3501 in an
appeal of the trial court’s decision to suppress Sullivan’s incriminating statements. The government argued that Sullivan was not in
“custody,” hence no Miranda warnings were needed.
Alternatively, prosecutors argued that even if Sullivan had been
in custody, the statements were nonetheless admissible under
§ 3501. Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger, whose office must
approve all government appeals, withdrew the brief and submitted a

327. Id.
328. Professor Cassell provides an interesting discussion of the background maneuvering
with respect to this brief. See Cassell, supra note 72, 203-05.
329. See Brief of the United States at 20-22, United States v. Cheely, 21 F.3d 914 (9th
Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-30257, 92-30504).
330. See Paul G. Cassell, Tossing Out the Law on Confessions, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 24,
1995, at 26, 30.
331. See Memorandum of the United States Relating to the Question Whether to Entertain Rehearing En Banc at 9, Cheely, 21 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-30257, 9230504).
332. 138 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1998).
333. See id. at 129.
334. See id.
335. See United States v. Sullivan, 948 F. Supp. 549, 551 (E.D. Va. 1996).
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replacement that did not discuss § 3501.336 Although the Fourth
Circuit granted the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) leave to
file an amicus brief raising § 3501,337 it reversed the district court’s
finding that Sullivan was in custody.338 Consequently, no Miranda
warnings were needed and the § 3501 argument was rendered
moot.339 Once again, the government affirmatively squelched any attempt to raise § 3501.
The Fourth Circuit, however, remained a focal point in efforts to
raise § 3501 arguments. In United States v. Leong,340 for example,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes at the time he
made an incriminating statement.341 In response, the Justice Department moved to dismiss the indictment. The Washington Legal
Foundation, however, filed an amicus brief raising § 3501, prompting the court to order the parties to address the statute. The Justice
Department argued that Miranda “is a rule that Congress cannot
supersede by legislation,” so “it would not be appropriate for the
lower courts . . . to apply § 3501 to admit a defendant’s statement in
a case in which Miranda would require its suppression, or for the
Department of Justice to urge the lower courts to do so.”342
The Fourth Circuit, however, retained jurisdiction over the case
and ordered the Department and Leong’s counsel to brief the
§ 3501 issue.343 Doubtless to the defendant’s delight, the government joined him in arguing that the statute violated the Constitution.344Shortly thereafter, Attorney General Janet Reno notified Congress that the Department would not defend § 3501 in the lower

336. See Jody Tabner Thayer, The Exclusionary Suggestion?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 24,
24; Paul G. Cassell & Paul D. Kamenar, Another Law Janet Reno Doesn’t Like, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 27, 1997, at A13.
337. Four members of the Senate also supported the WLF Brief: Senators Strom Thurmond, Jon Kyl, Jeff Sessions, and John Ashcroft—all Republican members of the Judiciary
Committee.
338. See United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 132 (4th Cir. 1998).
339. See id. at 134 n.*.
340. No. 96-4876, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15480 (4th Cir. Jun. 26, 1997).
341. See id. at *11.
342. Government Won’t Defend 1968 Law Designed to Overrule Miranda Decision, 66
U.S. L. WK. 2170 (Sept. 23, 1997).
343. See Order at 1, United States v. Leong, No. 96-4876, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
15480 (4th Cir. Jun. 26, 1997) (No. 96-4876).
344. See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 23, Leong (No. 96-4876).
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lower courts.345 The Department’s Leong brief, however, reserved the
right to argue § 3501 in the Supreme Court because that Court,
unlike the lower courts, “is free to reconsider its prior decisions, and
the Department of Justice is free to urge it to do so.”346
The circuit court ultimately declined to hear the case, explaining
that because an amicus had raised the issue for the first time on a petition for rehearing, it would only decide whether it was “plain error” for the district court to have suppressed the confession in the
face of the statute.347 The court furthered explained that because the
district court did not act in plain error, the Fourth Circuit would not
consider the statute’s constitutionality on a rehearing petition.348
The action surrounding § 3501 subsequently shifted to the
Tenth Circuit, where the Utah district court upheld the statute in
United States v. Rivas-Lopez.349 In perhaps the most important
§ 3501 case since Crocker, the district court relied on the statute to
admit a confession taken in violation of Miranda.350
In Rivas-Lopez, state troopers stopped the defendant for a speeding violation.351 After noticing what appeared to be drug residue, the
troopers requested and received permission to search the rest of the
vehicle.352 The troopers advised the defendant of his rights, following
which the defendant twice responded that he did not wish to waive
his rights; the officer later asked whether he would talk “out of
Miranda,” the suspect agreed and made incriminating statements.353
In resolving the subsequent motion to suppress, the district
court focused on whether Miranda or § 3501 would apply.354 The
troopers apparently violated Miranda, but the question of admissibility under § 3501 was unclear.355 Although the government refused
to press the issue, the district court accepted the argument of amicus

345. See Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Hon. Albert Gore, Jr., President of
the Senate 1 (Sept. 10, 1997) (on file with author).
346. Supplemental Brief for the United States at 7, Leong (No. 96-4876).
347. See Order at 4-6, Leong (No. 96-4876).
348. See id.
349. 988 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Utah 1997).
350. See id. at 1436.
351. See id. at 1426.
352. See id.
353. Id. at 1426-27.
354. See id. at 1429.
355. See id. at 1436.
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Safe Streets Coalition and applied the statute.356 The district court
stated that “[t]he validity of § 3501(a) and (b) therefore depends
upon whether Miranda imposes constitutional requirements or is an
exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervisory powers over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.”357 The court held
that Miranda merely was procedural, declared § 3501 constitutional,
applied § 3501 to the facts of the case, and ordered a new evidentiary hearing to explore the relevant factors.358
The district court further acknowledged the government’s “curious position” in agreeing with the defendant that § 3501 was unconstitutional.359 The court, however, ruled that the Tenth Circuit had
previously “squarely upheld the constitutionality” of § 3501 in
Crocker and thus felt bound by circuit precedent.360 In questioning
the government’s odd stance, the court commented that:
The government implies that the Miranda jurisprudence since the
Crocker case would undoubtedly persuade this circuit to alter its
course if given the chance, but apparently the government does not
want to give the Tenth Circuit that chance. Given the above review
of the cases and post-Miranda decisions, this court declines to so
speculate, and will and must follow the precedent set in this circuit.361

Although Rivas-Lopez would have been an excellent vehicle with
which to litigate the § 3501 issue, the case ground to a halt when
the defendant jumped bail and disappeared.362
H. Dickerson and Dicta
It has since become clear why the Justice Department has broken
with the past several administrations and chosen not to defend the
statute: the Clinton Administration has taken the position that
§ 3501 is unconstitutional. While this is certainly not an uncommon

356. See id. at 1430.
357. Id. at 1430.
358. See id. at 1434-36.
359. Id. at 1430.
360. Id. at 1435.
361. Id.
362. The District of Utah has since reaffirmed Rivas-Lopez’s holding that § 3501 supplants Miranda. See United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256 (D. Utah
1999).
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view within the legal academy, it represents a departure from past
administrations and former Justice Department policy.
What no Justice Department had accomplished, and, under the
Clinton Administration has even opposed, the private bar achieved.
In United States v. Dickerson,363 the Fourth Circuit upheld § 3501
against constitutional challenge.364 The case involved a serial bank
robber whom federal agents had taken into custody and interviewed.
At the suppression hearing, the agent in charge testified that he gave
Dickerson his Miranda warnings and obtained a valid waiver.365According to the agent, Dickerson offered his incriminating statements
after the waiver was obtained.366 Dickerson, unsurprisingly, testified
that he gave his incriminating statements during the interview before
he received his Miranda warnings.367 The district court, noting discrepancies between the agent’s testimony and information written on
the waiver of rights form, ruled in favor of the defendant and thus
suppressed the confession.368 The defendant did not argue however,
that his confession was in any way involuntary. Rather, he argued
simply that a technical violation of his Miranda rights had occurred:
that the warning had come after rather than before he had made his
slip of the tongue.369
The U.S. Attorney’s office filed a motion for reconsideration that
included affidavits from several agents corroborating the testimony
that Dickerson had received his Miranda warnings at the start, as
opposed to the end, of the interrogation.370 The government also
raised § 3501 as an alternative basis for admitting the statements.371
The district court, however, declined to reconsider its ruling.372 The
government subsequently filed an appeal with the Fourth Circuit,
arguing that the district court’s decision should be reversed.373

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 671.
See id. at 675.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 675-76.
See id. at 675.
See id. at 676-77.
See id. at 676.
See id. at 677.
See id. at 677-78.
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During this time, the Justice Department announced that it
would no longer defend § 3501 in the lower courts.374 The government’s brief in Dickerson duly noted that the Department now prevented the government from raising § 3501 on appeal.375 Amid this,
the Washington Legal Foundation filed an amicus brief arguing that
§ 3501 was applicable, noting that the government had presented
§ 3501 before the district court in its motion for reconsideration,
rendering this issue cognizable before the court.376 The Fourth Circuit permitted the Washington Legal Foundation, as amicus, to defend the statute during oral argument.
Just over a year later, the Fourth Circuit announced its opinion,
upholding § 3501 against constitutional attack. Specifically, the
court held that “[w]e have little difficulty concluding . . . that
§ 3501, enacted at the invitation of the Supreme Court and pursuant
to Congress’s unquestioned power to establish the rules of procedure and evidence in the federal courts, is constitutional.”377 However, the Court castigated the Department of Justice for “elevating
politics over law” by refusing to defend the statute.378
The court thus firmly held that “§ 3501, rather than the judicially created rule of Miranda,” governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court.379 The court explained that Congress had enacted the statute “with the express purpose of legislatively overruling
Miranda,”380 and that Congress had the authority to do so only if
the Miranda warnings were not constitutionally mandated.381 Relying on post-Miranda cases in which the Court referred to the warnings as “prophylactic,”382 and “not themselves protected by the
Constitution,”383 the court of appeals ruled:

374. See Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno, supra note 344.
375. Brief for the United States at 34 n.19, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667
(4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750).
376. Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Appellant United States at
12-13, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750).
377. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 671.
381. Id. at 672.
382. Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)).
383. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
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As a consequence, the irrebutable presumption created by the
Court in Miranda—that a confession obtained without the warnings is presumed involuntary—is a fortiori not required by the
Constitution. Accordingly, Congress necessarily possess [sic] the
legislative authority to supercede the conclusive presumption created by Miranda pursuant to its authority to prescribe the rules of
procedure and evidence in the federal courts.384

The court noted the dissent’s contention that the Miranda
warnings were necessarily constitutionally compelled, or they presumably could not have been applied to the states, but concluded it
to be an “interesting academic question” that “has no bearing on
our conclusion that Miranda’s conclusive presumption is not required by the Constitution.”385 The court then applied § 3501 to
Dickerson, and determined that the confession should have been
admitted.
In dissent, Judge Michael argued that the court should not have
reached the § 3501 issue because it had not been presented by the
386
Department. After the decision was handed down, Dickerson filed
a petition for rehearing en banc. In an unusual move, the Department joined Dickerson in asking for the en banc review. The Department claimed that the Fourth Circuit’s decision to rely upon
§ 3501 was in “error, and that its holding deserves reconsideration
by the full court of appeals.”387 The WLF filed a reply, defending the
circuit’s decision. The WLF further argued that en banc review was
not warranted in this case because the Department had always maintained that it might take a different position on § 3501 in the Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit ultimately denied panel rehearing
or en banc reconsideration. As of this writing, the Supreme Court
has granted Dickerson’s petition for certiorari.388 The Department of
Justice, however, has once again joined Dickerson and will argue
that § 3501 is unconstitutional.

384. Id. at 690-91.
385. Id. at 691.
386. Id. at 695 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
387. Brief for the United States in Support of Partial Hearing En Banc, Dickerson v.
United States, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750).
388. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
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I. Litigation Redux
The litigation history of § 3501 is a bit difficult to decipher. It is
surprising that a statute potentially as significant as § 3501 could be
so haphazardly enforced. Even presidential administrations that supported the statute in theory failed to adopt any coordinated effort to
seek the statute’s enforcement. Although a number of possible explanations for this failure exist—constitutional doubts, concerns
about the Supreme Court’s composition and receptivity of the federal judiciary to the statute, prosecutors’ general unfamiliarity with
the statute—none seems satisfactory. Perhaps the most important
factor in the statute’s decline is that federal law enforcement officers,
who had been giving Miranda-like warnings to suspects years before
the Court made it mandatory, had little difficulty continuing that
practice. Because warnings were given in the vast majority of cases, it
may have been difficult for prosecutors both familiar with the statute
and willing to use it to find a proper case. Yet, it remains difficult to
believe that the search was particularly aggressive, as so many seemingly “appropriate” test cases were identified during the Clinton
Administration.
In fact, courts have invoked the statute in a variety of other contexts.389 By far, the most common use of the statute has been with
respect to subsection (c)’s limitation on pre-arraignment delay.390
Cases confronting the Miranda issue, however, are few and far
between. Even so, numerous courts have been willing to use the factors articulated in § 3501(b) to assess a confession’s voluntariness,391
389. The cases cited herein represent but a fraction of those in which § 3501 was raised
in some fashion. A complete survey of federal cases addressing the statute is on file with the
author.
390. A computer-assisted search of cases addressing 3501(c)’s provisions involving prearraignment delay uncovered more than 300 cases, many of which are unpublished. See, e.g.,
United States v. Broeske, 178 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pugh, 25 F.3d 669
(8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Pham, 815 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1993); United States v. Rivera, 750 F. Supp. 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Lukens, 735 F. Supp. 387 (D. Wyo. 1990); United States v.
Yong Bing-Gong, 594 F. Supp. 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Arcediamo, 371 F.
Supp. 457 (D.N.J. 1974).
391. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1767 (1999); United States v. Delacorte, 113 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Clarke, 110 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cournoyer, 118 F.3d 1279 (8th Cir.
1997); United States v. Solano-Godines, 119 F.3d 8 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion);
United States v. Hornbeck, 118 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d
747 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hodrick, 81 F.3d 171 (9th Cir. 1996) (table opinion),
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but they have, by and large, either read the statute and Miranda in
harmony, or failed altogether to note the constitutional issue.392
Some courts have acknowledged the constitutional controversy swirling around § 3501, but have avoided it by ruling on alternative
grounds.393 Similarly, where prosecutors have argued on the basis of
§ 3501, courts have deemed it inapplicable for a variety of reasons,
largely involving whether the defendant was in custody when the
confession was made.394 Other courts, while relying on the voluntariness factors articulated in the statute, have held that Miranda
plainly trumps § 3501.395
Interestingly, courts have also been willing to invoke § 3501 in a
number of related situations that accrue to the defendant’s benefit.
For example, courts have often relied upon § 3501 to ensure that a
defendant receives a pretrial voluntariness hearing,396 or to instruct
full text available at No.94-50549, 94-50554, 1996 WL 155147 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 1996);
United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d
1305 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Makes Room for Them, 49 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Thigpen, 19 F.3d 31 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished decision); United States v.
Parker, 997 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1993); United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Briscoe, No.
CRIM NO. 1999-133, 1999 WL 970247 (D.V.I. Oct. 18, 1999); United States v. Quiroz, 57
F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Minn. 1999); United States v. Kaminski, No. 97-CR-382 (RSP/DH),
1998 WL 275594 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 1998); United States v. Loeffler, No. CRIM. A. 97446, 1998 WL 254962 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1998); United States v. Som, No.
CRIM.A.96CR243RSPGJD, CRIM.A.96CR244RSPGJD, 1998 WL 326778 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.
12, 1998); United States v. Bad Hand, 926 F. Supp. 891 (D.S.D. 1996); United States v.
Headdress, 953 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Utah 1996); United States v. DeJesus, 912 F. Supp. 129
(E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Saleh, No. S3 93 Cr. 181(MBM), 1994 WL 549538
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1994); United States v. Copeland, 830 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
United States v. Rivera-Ruiz, 797 F. Supp. 78 (D.P.R. 1992).
392. See, e.g., United States v. Little, 122 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1997) (table opinion), full
text available at Nos. 96-4569, 96-4586, 1997 WL 563148 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1997); United
States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Brown, 999 F.2d 548
(10th Cir. 1993), full text available at No. 91-6366, 1993 WL 261953 (10th Cir. June 29,
1993).
393. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 429 (1999); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 781 n.5 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d.
672 (D.V.I. 1999).
394. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 984 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Kan. 1997); United States
v. McNaughton, 848 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
395. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 871 F. Supp 988 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev’d, 87 F.3d
927 (7th Cir. 1996).
396. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997); United States
v. Gonzalez, 105 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 1997) (table opinion), full text available at No. 963083, 1997 WL 7273 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 1997); United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d
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the jury to give a confession such weight as it deems appropriate,397
or both.398
Until certain individuals picked up the baton dropped during the
Clinton Administration, there existed no coordinated effort to press
the statute. “Press” is used here as opposed to “enforce” because until the Clinton Justice Department, while no Administration enforced the statute vigorously, all—save perhaps the Johnson Administration—considered it constitutional. But it was not until the private
bar became involved that courts began taking § 3501 seriously.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT AND § 3501
The Supreme Court has not been entirely oblivious to § 3501’s
existence. The Court apparently first acknowledged the statute’s potential importance in Lego v. Twomey,399 which involved the standard
by which the government was required to prove voluntariness and
whether, once proved, the issue still called for a separate hearing outside the jury’s presence. The Court did note § 3501, but found it
“inapplicable here.”400
Although the Court had occasion to cite to the statute over the
years,401 it did not have the opportunity to consider the statute’s

1142 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Lee, 16 F.3d 1222 (6th Cir. 1994) (table opinion), full
text available at No. 91-3833, 1994 WL 20089 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1994); United States v.
Iwegbu, 6 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Miller, 987 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Maxwell, 484 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Douchette, 979
F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wayne, 977 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1992) (table
opinion), full text available at No. 91-10547, 1992 WL 302183 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1992);
Randall v. United States, 454 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cluchette, 465
F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Som, No. CRIM.A.96CR243RSPGJD,
CRIM.A.96CR244RSPGJD, 1998 WL 59462 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 1998); United States v. De
Yian, No. 94 Cr. 719 (DLC), 1995 WL 368445 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1995); United States v.
Barnett, 814 F. Supp. 1449 (D. Alaska 1992); United States v. Stevens, No. 91 Cr. 0881
(KTD), 1992 WL 30586 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1992); United States v. Infelise, 773 F. Supp. 93
(N.D. Ill. 1991).
397. See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 114 F.3d 1190 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Kaba, 999 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1993).
398. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 16 F.3d 1324 (2d Cir. 1994). The following cases
use § 3501 in jury instructions only: United States v. Goss, 484 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Robinson, 459 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Fromal, 733 F.
Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
399. 404 U.S. 477 (1971).
400. Id. at 486 n.14.
401. See, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986); United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 678 (1980); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975); Keeble v. United
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constitutionality. In large part, this was the result of the government’s failure to press the issue before the Court. In United States v.
Green,402 for example, the Court took the unusual step of initiating a
discussion about the statute from the bench. In Green, the Court
considered the admissibility of a defendant’s potentially incriminating statements. Although the government had failed to raise § 3501
below, the Court raised it, sua sponte, during oral argument:
QUESTION: Mr. Roberts [representing the United States], can I
ask about a provision that I didn’t even know about? I’ve been listening to Miranda cases and Edwards cases and Minnick cases for
seven terms now. Why has the United States never cited in any of
those cases 18 USC Section 3501? Is there some reason?
MR. ROBERTS: Well, I don’t know why it has never been cited.
...
QUESTION: It’s certainly very relevant to this case, very relevant
to a lot of other cases. It has never been cited to us.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, we didn’t rely on it below in this case, and
so we’re not in a position to rely upon it here.
...
QUESTION: Well, but don’t—does the Government not feel any
duty to call the statute to the attention of lower courts?
QUESTION: Or to this Court?
MR. ROBERTS: I’m not aware that we have relied on it at any
point.403

In short, the government was not prepared to address § 3501’s
relevance. Thus, even when the Court presented the issue on the
proverbial silver platter, the government seemed reluctant to raise
the statute. Unfortunately, the Green Court did not have the opporStates, 412 U.S. 205, 207 n.3 (1973); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 n.14 (1972).
402. 504 U.S. 908, cert. dismissed, 507 U.S. 545 (1993) (certiorari dismissed after the
death of respondent).
403. Transcript of Oral Argument in United States v. Green, No. 91-1521, 1992 WL
687878, at *18-*20 (Nov. 30, 1992).
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tunity to consider the statute’s applicability. It dismissed the case
when the respondent died, postponing § 3501’s day of reckoning.
The Court did consider the effect of § 3501(c), concerning prearraignment delay. In United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez,404 the Court
identified without qualification § 3501 as “the statute governing the
admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions.”405 There, the
Court concluded that the provisions of § 3501(c), which require a
suspect to be brought before a magistrate within six hours, were not
triggered until there was an arrest by a federal officer.406 The Court
therefore found it unnecessary to decide whether the statute replaced
the Court’s so-called McNabb-Mallory rule requiring the suppression
of a voluntary confession made during delay in presenting a suspect
before a magistrate. The Justice Department had no trouble defending this part of § 3501 or explaining in its brief that the statute “requires the admission” of voluntary statements.407 The Department
neither suggested that § 3501(a) was unconstitutional, nor did it address the severability question that would inevitably arise if the Court
upheld one provision of the statute, but not another. While the constitutionality of § 3501(a) was not at issue, it is worth noting that
the government expressed no qualms about the statute when it had
the chance.
The government again had the opportunity to litigate the issue
less than a year later. In Davis v. United States,408 the government
was again asked by the Court to clarify its position with respect to
§ 3501. Davis involved a federal court-martial in which the defendant sought to use his ambiguous request for counsel as a means to
suppress his subsequent statements implicating him in a murder.
Davis did not contend that his statements were in any way “involuntary”; rather, he argued only that his request for counsel, however
inarticulate, should have stopped further questioning.
Despite an amicus brief from the Washington Legal Foundation
raising the § 3501 issue, the Solicitor General’s Office asserted that

404. 511 U.S. 350 (1994).
405. Id. at 351.
406. See id. at 358.
407. Brief for the United States, United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994)
(No. 82-1812).
408. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
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§ 3501 was inapplicable in the context of a court-martial.409 During
oral argument, Richard Seamon, the Assistant to the Solicitor General was pointedly asked whether § 3501 had any bearing on the
case. He declined even to express an opinion on whether it was relevant to ordinary criminal prosecutions, however. The Court then
grilled him on the government’s failure to take a position with respect to the statute:
QUESTION: I find it extraordinary that you don’t take a position
on that and haven’t taken a position on that for many years. I can’t
understand. The language of 3501 seems to squarely apply, and the
Government just comes in time after time and doesn’t take any position on raising 3501, continues to argue Miranda as though
there’s no statute specifically addressing it?
MR. SEAMON [representing the United States]: IQUESTION: Now, today the reason is that this is under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which we’re going to interpret to be
stricter on prophylactic results, contrary to everything else I’ve ever
seen, than is civil or civilian criminal procedures. But it seems to me
the Government ought to have a position on this.
MR. SEAMON: You may well be right, Justice Scalia.410

Although repeatedly pressed by the Court with respect to the
government’s position on § 3501, Mr. Seamon stated: “We don’t
take a position on that issue.”411 Despite the Court’s earlier prodding, as in Green, the government was either ill-prepared, or unwilling, to address § 3501.
The Davis Court relied on Miranda to hold that police officers
may continue to interrogate a suspect until he clearly and unambiguously requests counsel. It did not consider the effect (if any) of
§ 3501; because the Department had not relied on § 3501, the
Court would “decline the invitation of some amici to consider it.”412
The government was not permitted to escape entirely unscathed,

409. See Brief for the United States at 18 n.13, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452
(1994) (No. 92-1949).
410. Official Transcript of Oral Argument in Davis v. United States, at 44-45, 512 U.S.
452 (1994) (No. 92-1949).
411. Id. at 44.
412. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994).
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however. Justice Scalia penned a concurring opinion devoted to
§ 3501 in which he argued that the Court should in the future consider the statute sua sponte if it is not raised by the parties:
I agree with the Court that it is proper, given the Government’s
failure to raise the point, to render judgment without taking account of § 3501. But the refusal to consider arguments not raised
is a sound prudential practice, rather than a statutory or constitutional mandate, and there are times when prudence dictates the
contrary. As far as I am concerned, such a time will have arrived
when a case that comes within the terms of this statute is next presented to us.413

That time arrived five years later in Dickerson. But before we
consider that landmark ruling, a review of more recent congressional
action is in order.
VII. CONGRESS REDISCOVERS § 3501
Article II of the Constitution requires the Executive Branch to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”414 At times, this
constitutional injunction creates tension between the executive and
legislative branches. Ordinarily, the Executive Branch must enforce
congressional acts.415 Although some scholars have argued that the
Executive Branch is required to defend all such acts,416 it is more
generally understood that the Executive Branch “has the duty to defend an act of Congress whenever a reasonable argument can be
made in support, even if the attorney general and the lawyers examining the case concluded that the argument may ultimately be unsuccessful in the courts.”417 Controversy has erupted over whether
this requirement to defend all “reasonable” acts extends to statutes
which are of dubious constitutionality. Occasionally, the executive
department has declined to enforce a statute it concludes is unconstitutional. In such circumstances, Congress has statutorily required the
413. Id. at 464 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
414. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
415. Indeed, the Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]o contend that the obligation
imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their
execution, is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible.” Kendall v.
United States, 37 U.S. (1 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838).
416. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 306
(1974); EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 79 (3d ed. 1948).
417. 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 25, 25-26 (1981).
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Justice Department to inform the legislative branch when it declines
to defend a congressional act.418 This issue never arose with respect
to § 3501, partly because each administration deemed the statute
constitutional, and partly because no Department had squarely litigated the statute’s constitutionality.
Congress, which appeared largely indifferent to the fate of
§ 3501, rediscovered the statute in 1995, and ultimately forced the
Clinton Administration to take a stand on the statute’s constitutionality. Shortly after taking control of the Senate, Republican members
called upon the Justice Department to enforce § 3501 and introduced a crime bill that included, among other things, a redrafting of
§ 3501(a) to place the burden of proving “involuntariness” upon the
defendant and limiting the effect of pre-arraignment delay on a confession’s admissibility.419 Although nothing became of the legislation,
the Senate took a keen interest in the statute, making it a focus of
inquiry during the nominations hearings of several key Department
officials.
At first, the Clinton Administration took a cautious view of the
statute. In response to a written question from Senator Orrin Hatch
following an oversight hearing into the Department of Justice’s activities, Attorney General Reno explained “[t]he Department of Justice does not have a policy that would preclude it from defending the
constitutional validity of Section 3501 in an appropriate case.”420
The Attorney General’s statement essentially mirrored that of her
predecessors.
When a seemingly appropriate case (Cheely) did arise, the Department changed course. During an oversight hearing focusing on
the Solicitor General’s Office, Senator Fred Thompson queried then
Solicitor General Drew Days on the Department’s commitment to
enforcing § 3501. Questions had arisen as to the Department’s enthusiasm to enforce the statute in light of its reversal of course in
Cheely. Under Senator Thompson’s questioning, Solicitor General
Days denied that the Department had adopted a policy of declining
to enforce the statute.421 In fact, he emphatically stated:
418. 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1994).
419. See S.3, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1995, § 507, 28
U.S.C. § 994 (1995).
420. Department of Justice Oversight: Hearing on Focusing on the Administration of Justice
and the Enforcement of Laws Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 52 (1995).
421. See Solicitor General Oversight: Hearing on the Operation and Activities of the Office
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Let me make clear, Senator, that there is no policy in the Department, and the Attorney General has already advised the committee
of this fact, against raising 3501 in an appropriate case. Indeed, we
have used some provisions of 3501. . . .
So I think it is really a question of our making the decision as
prosecutors when we are going to raise these issues.422

The Solicitor General’s response at the same time echoed that of
other key Department officials, and predicted the Department’s future position.
Again in 1997, Attorney General Reno, when asked whether the
Department would raise § 3501 in appropriate circumstances, promised “I’d do it if it’s right in an appropriate case.”423 This “appropriate case” language seemed to make the rounds. In June of 1997,
then-United States Attorney Eric Holder, during his hearing to be
confirmed as Deputy Attorney General, promised to support the
statute in an “appropriate” situation. “I would,” he declared, “support the use of Section 3501 in an appropriate circumstance.”424
Foreshadowing events to come, he explained, however, that as
U.S. Attorney, his “office has not invoked subsections (a) and (b) of
Section 3501 . . . even though officers may not have complied with
the dictates of Miranda.”425 “Nor . . . has my office invoked this provision during the tenure of my predecessors.”426
The Department appeared reluctant to invoke the provision at
all. In the wake of the Leong case, Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and five additional members of that
committee wrote Attorney General Reno and asked her to defend
the statute:
We believe that section 3501 is constitutional. While the Supreme
Court has not passed in this question directly, we believe that the

of Solicitor General Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 31-33 (1995).
422. Id. at 31; see also id. at 42 (answering question from Senator Biden that “with respect to [§] 3501, as I indicated earlier, there is no Department policy against using 3501 in an
appropriate case”).
423. Department of Justice Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 89-90 (1997).
424. Nominations of Joel I. Klein and Eric H. Holder, Jr.: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 124 (1997).
425. Id.
426. Id.
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court would uphold the statute. . . . The undersigned Members do
not want to see guilty offenders go free to a technical error if the
department easily can prevent such a miscarriage of justice by invoking the current law.427

In that same letter, the Senators recounted the repeated assurances they had received from Department officials that the statute
would be defended in “an appropriate case.” They noted, for example, the Solicitor General’s testimony concerning the decision of the
Department not to pursue § 3501 in Cheely, pointing out that
Mr. Days attributed the Department’s refusal . . . to pursue the issue any further in the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Cheely
not to doubts about its constitutionality-indeed he never suggested
in the course of the hearing that the Department had any such
doubts-but instead to various litigation strategy considerations. He
specifically stated that the decision not to press the argument in
those cases ‘doesn’t mean we won’t under other circumstances.’428

In response to the Senators’ letter, the Attorney General notified
Congress that the Department would not defend § 3501 in the
lower courts.429 She explained that the Department reserved the
right, however, to invoke the statute in the Supreme Court. Apparently, the only “appropriate case” in the Justice Department’s view
was one arising in the Supreme Court. Indeed, John C. Keeny, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, issued a
memorandum explaining the Department’s decision not to defend
the statute in Leong to all U.S. attorneys and department section
chiefs. The memorandum communicated the Department’s position
that “unless the Supreme Court were to modify or overrule
Miranda . . . lower courts are not free to rely on Section 3501 to
admit statements that would be excluded by Miranda.”430 Although
the memorandum explained that the Department had not yet de-

427. Letter from Senators Orrin Hatch, Strom Thurmond, Fred Thompson, Jon Kyl,
John Ashcroft, and Jeff Sessions to Attorney General Janet Reno 3, 5 (Aug. 28, 1997) (copy
on file with author).
428. Id. at 4-5 (quoting testimony of Solicitor General Drew Days).
429. Letter From Attorney General Janet Reno to the Honorable Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate 1 (Nov. 1, 1997); cf. 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1994) (requiring the Department of
Justice to notify Congress when refusing to enforce statute).
430. Memorandum for All United States Attorneys and Criminal Division Section Chiefs
from John C. Keeny, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division 2 (Nov. 6,
1997).
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cided whether it would ask the Supreme Court to “overrule or modify Miranda,” it required prosecutors to “consult[]” with the Criminal Division in any case involving the § 3501’s voluntariness provision.431 The difficulty, of course, was that if the Department refused
to invoke the statute in the lower courts, it was unlikely but (as subsequent events have shown), not impossible, for the Supreme Court
ever to consider the statute.
The Judiciary Committee later pressed the Department on its
position with respect to § 3501. Some three months after receiving
Attorney General Reno’s notification letter, Judiciary Committee
Chairman Orrin Hatch asked Solicitor General nominee Seth Waxman whether he believed that the Fifth Amendment compelled the
Miranda warnings. Rather than focusing on the Department’s view
of § 3501, Chairman Hatch instead decided to uncover whether the
Solicitor General nominee believed the Miranda warnings to be a
constitutional mandate. Mr. Waxman responded:
It is my understanding of Miranda . . . that the Miranda warnings
themselves were not ever regarded as direct requirements compelled by the Constitution. Rather, . . . the Court reached its holding in Miranda as one means of implementing the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compulsory self-incrimination in the
context of custodial interrogation. The Court itself recognized that
Congress or the States might supplant the Miranda warnings if
those bodies provided equally effective means of apprising suspects
of their rights.432

The crucial issue in this debate would therefore become whether
§ 3501 satisfied Miranda’s holding, as an “equally effective” means
of protecting suspects’ rights.
The Committee’s exploration of this issue culminated with Senator Strom Thurmond’s examination of James Robinson, nominated
to head the Criminal Division. During Robinson’s confirmation
hearing, Senator Thurmond pointedly asked whether he believed
§ 3501 to be unconstitutional.433 Mr. Robinson responded by observing “it is a difficult question. To use a law school analogy, . . . it
431. See id.
432. Nomination of Seth Waxman to be Solicitor General: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 101 (1997).
433. See The Nomination of James K. Robinson to be Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 12 (1998).
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is an essay question rather than a true-false question,” one that the
Department had long struggled with.434
And struggle the Department did. Following the Dickerson decision, Senator Hatch, joined by eight of his Senate colleagues, once
again urged the Department to enforce § 3501. The Senators noted
that Department officials had repeatedly pledged to defend congressional acts where they could make reasonable arguments: “The
Dickerson decision demonstrates beyond doubt that there are ‘reasonable arguments’ to defend 18 U.S.C. 3501. In fact, these arguments are so reasonable that they have prevailed in every Court that
has directly addressed their merits.”435 Dickerson forced the Department to take a stand. While Department officials had claimed that
they would enforce the statute in an “appropriate case” and intimated that they may choose to argue the case before the Supreme
Court, they finally took the stance in Dickerson that the statute was
unconstitutional.
More recently, Senator Strom Thurmond chaired a subcommitted hearing to examine the Justice Department’s refusal to enforce
§ 3501.436 The hearing focused on three broad themes: first, whether
previous administrations had supported § 3501’s constitutionality,
and whether the Clinton Administration could refuse to enforce the
statute; second, whether Miranda had adversely affected criminal investigations; and finally, whether Congress could, pursuant to its authority to establish judicial rules of evidence and procedure, statutorily supplant the now-familiar warnings. Witnesses affirmed the view
that the Clinton Administration’s decision not to enforce the statute
the
broke with long-standing Department precedent.437Similarly,
subcommittee heard testimony that Miranda had a substantial negative impact on criminal investigations.438 Unsurprisingly, the legal
scholars who testified at the hearing sharply disagreed over

434. Id.
435. Letter from Senator Orrin Hatch and Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
to Attorney General Janet Reno, 1-2 (Mar. 4, 1999) (copy on file with author).
436. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight of the Comm. on the
Judiciary (May 13, 1999).
437. See id. at 8-9 (statement of Stephen J. Markman); id. at 39 (statement of Paul Cassell).
438. See id. at 21-25 (statement of Gilbert G. Gallegos); id. at 67-83 (statement of Paul
Cassell).
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Congress’s authority439 to statutorily modify Miranda’s requirements. Regardless, the stage was set for the Court to intervene.
VIII. A QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
Dickerson has forced consideration of the issue of whether the
Miranda warnings are constitutionally compelled or, like the rules of
evidence, susceptible to modification. Instead of allowing the issue
to percolate in the lower courts, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari review in Dickerson and will soon consider § 3501’s constitutionality.440 This issue has spawned considerable scholarly debate.
Professor Paul Cassell has eloquently argued on behalf of the
statute’s constitutionality.441 His arguments, which I find persuasive,
build upon those originally advanced by Professor Joseph Grano in
his seminal work.442 Those arguments rest largely on two premises.
First, the claim is made that the Miranda Court expressly invited
Congress and the states to draft new procedural protections “equally
effective” in safeguarding suspects’ Fifth Amendment rights. If, it is
argued, the warnings were constitutionally mandated, then why did
the Supreme Court invite Congress and the states to craft their own
procedures?443
Second, regardless of what the Miranda Court may have intended, since that decision, the Court has regularly characterized the
warnings as “prophylactic” in nature and not themselves constitutionally guaranteed. In Michigan v. Tucker,444 for example, the Court
considered whether to admit testimony from a suspect about a witness who later incriminated that suspect at trial.445 The Tucker Court
deemed it relevant to ask whether the challenged police interrogation “directly infringed upon respondent’s right against compulsory
self-incrimination or whether it instead violated only the prophylactic

439. Compare id. at 26-34 (statements of Daniel C. Richman and George Thoma) with
id. at 34-67 (statement of Paul Cassell).
440. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
441. See Paul Cassell, supra note 72.
442. See generally JOSEPH GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993); see also
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 293, reprinted in 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 437, 515 (1989).
443. See Cassell, supra note 72; GRANO supra note 442.
444. 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (plurality opinion).
445. Id. at 436-37.

266

ONE-FIN.DOC

185]

5/20/00 7:23 PM

Undoing Miranda

rules developed to protect that right.”446 The police had given the
suspect incomplete Miranda warnings. The Court nevertheless upheld admission of the contested testimony on the ground that the
officers’ failure to provide adequate warnings “did not abridge respondent’s constitutional privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards
later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.”447 The Tucker Court stressed that Miranda did not “require[ ]
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of
the interrogation process.”448 In explaining that the warnings were
not constitutionally guaranteed rights, the Court observed that
Miranda styled them as “practical reinforcement” to protect the
right against compulsory self-incrimination.449
Subsequent to Tucker, the Court has continued to describe the
warnings as “prophylactic” rather than as “compelled” by the Fifth
Amendment.450 In Oregon v. Elstad,451 for example, the Court considered whether to exclude, pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine, a statement not preceded by Miranda warnings that
led to a later confession accompanied by appropriate warnings.452 In
ruling that the confession was properly admitted, the Court clarified
that the Miranda rule “sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. . . . Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a remedy
even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional
harm.”453 “[A] failure to administer Miranda warnings” the Court
declared, was not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment.454 A socalled non-Mirandized confession was thus not tantamount to an
“involuntary” confession. Because it refused to equate a Miranda
violation with a Fifth Amendment violation, the Court had little
446. Id. at 439.
447. Id. at 446.
448. Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
449. See id.
450. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994); Duckworth v. Eagan,
492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985).
451. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
452. Id. at 300.
453. Id. at 306-07; see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (stating that
Miranda warnings are necessary to “reduce the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to
constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation”); United States v. Crocker,
510 F.2d 1129, 1137 (10th Cir. 1975) (suggesting constitutionality of § 3501).
454. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 n.1.
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trouble in deciding that otherwise voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda may nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes.455 Presumably, if the warnings were Fifth Amendment requirements, then the government would be forbidden from using
statements taken in violation of Miranda.
Similarly, in creating a public safety exception to Miranda, the
court in New York v. Quarles 456 described the Miranda warnings as a
means for safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, rather than rights
protected by the constitution. Drawing a distinction between the
warnings and the right against compelled self-incrimination, the
Court explained that “the failure to provide Miranda warnings in and
of itself does not render a confession involuntary.”457 The Court effectively rebuffed the Miranda majority’s conclusion that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive. In part, this seeming reversal of
course may be a result of the Court’s differentiation between, as Professor Grano has illustrated, “potential” compulsion and “inherent”
compulsion. In other words, “jeopardizing Fifth Amendment rights
is different from actually violating them; and assuring that Fifth
Amendment rights are protected is different from concluding that
they have actually been infringed.”458 Setting aside these core constitutional issues for the time being, I would like briefly to explore several other problems with which the Supreme Court will likely grapple.
A. If Everyone Agrees, Does a Case or Controversy Exist?
At the outset, the Court must determine whether Article III
“case or controversy” requirements are met. This question, normally
self-evident in criminal cases, arises because the parties in interest—
Dickerson and the United States—agree that § 3501 is unconstitu455. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 228 (1971). But see New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (reaffirming its
views that “a defendant’s compelled statements, as opposed to statements taken in violation of
Miranda,” may not be used even for impeachment purposes at trial).
456. 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
457. Id. at 655 n.5 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966)).
458. JOSEPH GRANO, supra note 442, at 180. Similarly, the so-called “cat out of the bag
rule” applies when police initially failed to warn the suspect of his rights, subsequently realized
the oversight, and then afford the suspect the opportunity to confess again after having received proper warnings. The second confession is admissible provided that the first confession,
even if taken in violation of Miranda, was voluntary. In fact, police need not even inform her
that the initial confession was tainted. See Oregon v. Elstadt, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985).
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tional. As a consequence, the Court appointed an amicus to defend
the judgment of the court below.459 To say this is odd is a bit of an
understatement. If the parties in interest agree with respect to the
statute’s constitutionality, and the Court is forced to rely on an amicus to defend the judgment below, then does an Article III “case” or
“controversy” exist?
Article III limits federal courts to deciding “actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants.”460 By adopting this limitation, the
framers sought to confine federal courts to resolving only those disputes that “are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution

459. The Supreme Court has since appointed Paul Cassell as amicus to defend the judgment below. Although odd, it is not without precedent. In Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614 (1998), for example, the Supreme Court appointed amicus to brief and argue in support
of the decision below where the United States disagreed with the court of appeals’ analysis.
Similarly, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982), the Court invited an
amicus to file a brief and argue “in support of the judgements below” where the United States
was not prepared to do so. Dickerson, of course, is a criminal case, which makes the appointment of an amicus to represent the court’s judgment below a trifle more controversial. Although it is perhaps no more controversial than the United States’ unusual position in Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In that case, the United States actually took two seemingly opposing litigating positions before the Court. In a brief filed on behalf of the Attorney General
and the Federal Election Commission, the government argued that the Federal Election Campaign Act was a legitimate means of curbing corruption and did not run foul of the First
Amendment. Brief for the Attorney General & Federal Election Comm’n, Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437). In a separate brief filed on behalf of the Attorney General as appellee and for the United States as amicus, the government took the position
that certain aspects of the challenged statute may have infringed upon First Amendment values,
but that the case was not sufficiently ripe for the Supreme Court to review. Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee & for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437). In the second brief, the Attorney General was a named
defendant; thus, as a party, the Attorney General joined only a portion of the brief. In addition, the Federal Election Commission filed a brief supporting the statute’s constitutionality
and arguing on behalf of Congress’s authority to create an election commission. Brief of Federal Election Comm’n, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437).
460. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911). Article III states in relevant
part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between
two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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through the judicial process.”461 If a court purports to rule on an issue that is not a case or controversy, it is performing a duty that is
not “properly judicial,”462 and its opinion is merely advisory. The alleged problem in the Dickerson case stems from the fact that both
the government and the defendant seem to agree that § 3501 is unconstitutional.463
Does this eliminate the Article III case or controversy requirement? Probably not. The Court long ago articulated the basic case or
controversy requirements:
By cases and controversies are intended the claims of litigants
brought before the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are established by law or custom for the protection or
enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of
wrongs. Whenever the claim of a party under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States takes such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case.
The term implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties, whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication.464

While the parties are not adverse with respect to the legal claim,
if the statue is upheld, there will doubtless be “possible” adverse parties in the future. Additionally, the application of a statute to a particular factual scenario plainly bespeaks a situation in which the judicial power is capable of “acting upon” the legal issue presented.
Fourth Circuit law in the post-Dickerson world states that § 3501
controls the admission of voluntary statements. Although the Executive Branch has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional, and
likely will refuse to raise it, lower federal courts are bound by circuit
precedent to address it. This places the federal courts in an odd position, one that involves a “pure” legal question the Supreme Court is
particularly able to resolve.
Unquestionably, the parties’ agreement about the construction
of a particular law is not binding upon the courts. In Kamen v.

461. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
462. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 352 (quoting Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792)).
463. In fact, the government refused to raise the statute either before the district court or
the court of appeals and has now joined the defendant before the Supreme Court.
464. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 357 (quoting In re Pacific Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255
(N.D. Cal. 1887)).
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Kemper Financial Services,465 the Court explained that “[w]hen an
issue or claim is properly before the court,466 the court is not limited
to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”467 Unlike a factual finding, a legal interpretation does not lend itself to stipulation. The Court had recent
occasion to address this issue in a related context. In United States
National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America,468 a group of insurance agents challenged the Comptroller of the
Currency’s decision to permit the bank to sell insurance. The district
court granted summary judgment for the bank, ruling that 12
U.S.C. § 92, which authorizes banks to act as insurance agents in
towns with populations under five thousand, authorized the Comptroller’s decision. The insurance agents appealed, arguing that the
district court had misapplied the statute. The D.C. Circuit, however,
expressed some concern about whether the statute had been repealed
and, on its own motion, directed the parties to brief the question of
the statute’s continuing vitality. Despite the fact that the parties
stipulated that § 92 remained in effect, the court of appeals concluded that it had, in fact, been repealed, and thus entered judgment
for the agents. In a concurring opinion to the denial of rehearing en
banc, Judge David Sentelle explained: “[B]y declining to argue that
Congress repealed the section, appellants cannot stipulate into existence a repealed statute.”469 The Supreme Court subsequently vindicated the court of appeals’s decision to consider the statute sua
sponte.470 The Court explained that the parties’ decision whether the
465. 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
466. While some have suggested that the Court lacked legal authority to address the constitutionality of § 3501, an issue not raised below, it has been persuasively argued that the
Court may give sua sponte consideration to the applicability of a statute, regardless of whether
the parties raised it. See Eric D. Miller, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. §3501 Sua Sponte?, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 1029 (1998) (comment arguing that courts can consider § 3501 sua sponte).
Indeed, it has long been the case that “[t]he law . . .is a matter of which the courts of the
United States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or proof.” Lamar v. Micou, 114
U.S. 218, 223 (1885). Moreover, § 3501 is a directive to courts, not to prosecutors; thus it
should make no difference whether the parties raised the statute—courts have an independent
obligation to consider the applicability of relevant law.
467. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 99 (citation omitted) (footnote added).
468. 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
469. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 965 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Sentelle, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
470. U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993). Al-
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statute was repealed could not possibly bind the federal courts. A
contrary decision, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, would
put the Court in the position of possibly construing, and applying, a
non-existent statute.471
The Court’s refusal to be bound by the parties’ construction of a
statute is not of recent origin. The Court has long ignored the parties’ understanding as to “the legal issues in the present case and
those resolved by” precedent.472 In truth, the Court’s decisions are
often predicated on legal theories neither propounded by the parties,
nor raised in the courts below.473 The tradition of amicus curiae
submissions stands as a testament to the Court’s ability and occasional need to look beyond the parties’ understanding of the law.474
Consequently, in cases where a legal theory the Court finds essential to the decision requires further illumination, it has not hesitated to order rebriefing and reargument.475
Nor are there prudential reasons for the Court to fret about the
case or controversy requirement. The court of appeals undertook its
§ 3501 analysis openly and carefully. In no sense could the “losing
party claim to have been ambushed.”476 Both the government and
the defendant had “an opportunity to be heard” and “the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues.”477
Furthermore, the issue under consideration by the court of appeals was a pure question of law, which appellate courts are particuthough the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, it did so because it believed that the
statute had not been repealed. Id. at 462-63.
471. See id. at 464 (Scalia, J., concurring).
472. Sanford’s Estate v. IRS, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939).
473. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Kamen, 500 U.S. 90 (1991); Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990); Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660 (1990); McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Separate
opinions frequently set forth legal theories pressed by none of the parties. See, e.g., American
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Segura v. United
States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984).
474. See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 37.1, 28.7; FED. R. APP. P. 29.
475. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 503 U.S. 928 (1992);
McKesson v. Division of Alcohol Beverage and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1989); Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1984), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214 (1984); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 422 U.S. 1005 (1975); Benton v. Maryland, 393 U.S. 994
(1968).
476. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 42 n.2 (1992).
477. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).
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larly well-situated to consider de novo.478 The only possible factual
concern involves the timing of the Miranda warnings, but that is
wholly incidental to whether § 3501 should apply or how the statute
should be construed. Even if the “case or controversy” hurdle is successfully cleared, several other interesting problems remain. It is to
these questions I will now turn.
B. The Problem of Miranda’s Application to the States
Those advocating the Miranda warnings as being constitutionally required have persuasively argued that the Supreme Court could
not have foisted the warnings upon the states unless those warnings
were commanded by the Fifth Amendment. If, it is claimed,
Miranda merely reflects a prophylactic procedural rule, how can the
Court compel state courts to follow its terms? After all, the Court
has expressly disavowed the power to impose supervisory rules on
state courts.479 Rather, the Court’s power “is limited to enforcing the
commands of the United States Constitution.”480 If Miranda reflects
a procedural rule, the Court cannot easily justify its imposition of
that rule on state courts. It can impose its will upon those courts
only to the extent that federal constitutional issues are at stake. The
warnings thus must be, it is claimed, a constitutional command. The
Dickerson opinion acknowledges that Miranda’s application to the
states is “an interesting academic question.”481
Professor Cassell has offered perhaps the best answer to this perplexing question. He explains that Miranda “can be best understood
not as a constitutional command, but as an exercise of the Court’s
authority to improvise a remedy when it is presented with an issue
implicating a constitutional right for which there is not at the time of
the decision a constitutionally or legislatively specified remedy.”482 As

478. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994); Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231
(1991).
479. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (“Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of
constitutional dimension.”). As Justice Stevens has observed, the “Court’s power to require
state courts to exclude probative self-incriminating statements rests entirely” on the Court’s
power to enforce the Constitution. Oregon v. Elstadt, 470 U.S. 298, 370-71 & n.15 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
480. See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991).
481. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 691 n.21 (4th Cir. 1999).
482. Cassell, supra note 72, at 237.
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such, Congress is free to alter the rule as it sees fit—provided, of
course, that the remedial scheme enacted by Congress provides
“meaningful relief” for any constitutional violation.483
This explanation dovetails nicely with the Court’s persistent
characterization of the warnings as “prophylactic.” If the Miranda
warnings were in fact compelled by the Fifth Amendment then later
cases such as Oregon v. Elstead 484 and Michigan v. Tucker,485 in which
the Court draws a distinction between Miranda violations and Fifth
Amendment violations, cannot easily be explained. As Professor Cassell has noted, “The judicially devised remedy may sweep more
broadly than is strictly necessary to vindicate a particular constitutional right,” but is itself not a constitutional command.486 As a consequence of this line of reasoning, Congress is free to modify the
Court’s chosen remedy.
To understand, one must appreciate that the Miranda “remedy”
is not really a remedy at all. Rather, it is a prophylactic device—an anticipatory remedy—to ensure that no violation of the right, hence no
future remedy, is needed. The Court has itself explained that “[t]he
prophylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected
by the Constitution,”487 but instead are merely “recommended procedural safeguards.”488 The implications of this understanding are
important. In Miranda, the Court itself invited Congress to create a
system as protective of the suspect’s rights as the Miranda warnings.
This invitation aptly suits the claim that the particular formulation
the Court laid down is not constitutionally required, but instead is
an effort to prevent the violation of a right.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the Court considered the
question of whether it had supervisory authority over state courts. It
was not until considerably later that this issue was directly addressed
by the Court, and even then, no party has squarely presented the

483. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988). Cf. Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) (upholding statutory modification of court-created rule).
484. 470 U.S. 298, 306 n.1 (1985) (noting that “a simple failure to administer Miranda
warnings is not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment”); accord New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984).
485. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
486. Cassell, supra note 72, at 237.
487. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (internal quotation omitted).
488. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1994) (internal quotation omitted).

274

ONE-FIN.DOC

185]

5/20/00 7:23 PM

Undoing Miranda

issue of whether Miranda was a valid exercise of the Court’s supervisory authority.
If the Court decides that Miranda is merely a prophylactic safeguard, as Professor Cassell has argued, and upholds § 3501, an interesting question presents itself. What will state courts do, when confronted with a Fifth Amendment claim? After all, § 3501 applies by
its own terms only to federal courts. Thus, it does not apply to the
states. On the other hand, if Miranda is merely a supervisory rule,
then it can’t be binding upon the states. But, if the warnings are understood as a means of enforcing the Fifth Amendment, then the
Court’s decision makes sense. The Court disavowed that the states
were forever prevented from structuring law enforcement interrogations in a different manner. To assuage this “supervisory” problem,
the Court explained that “the States are free to develop their own
safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as
those described above in informing accused persons of their right of
silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”489
Miranda therefore contemplates a role for the states in the
elaboration of appropriate safeguards for the compelled selfincrimination privilege. Presumably, the Miranda warnings will continue to bind the states, at least until the states pick up the cudgel
and enact statutes that mirror § 3501, or Congress chooses to exercise its enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and
create similar rules for application in the states.
C. Boerne and the Problem of Constitutional Interpretation
Whether Miranda warnings are constitutionally required is only
one side of the equation. Even if the Court declines to equate
Miranda with the Fifth Amendment, it may nevertheless decide that
Congress lacks the statutory authority to resurrect constitutional
safeguards that the Court previously rejected as inadequate. After all,
§ 3501 endeavors to recreate the “voluntariness” doctrine that existed prior to Miranda.490 However, it could be argued, any congres489. Id. at 490.
490. The statute’s legislative history indeed confirms Congress’s objective to supersede
that case. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2137 (1968). The Senate Report explained that:
[b]y the express provisions of the proposed legislation the trial judge must take into
consideration all the surrounding circumstances in determining the issue of voluntariness, including specifically enumerated factors which historically enter into such a
determination. Whether or not the arrested person was informed of or knew his

275

ONE-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/20/00 7:23 PM

[2000

sional attempt to modify the Court’s constitutional judgment would
run afoul of the fundamental principles enshrined in Marbury v.
Madison.491 Otherwise, as the Court pointed out in City of Boerne v.
Flores,492 “[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment
process contained in Article V.”493 I think this argument is mistaken.
In Boerne, the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) as an improper encroachment upon the
federal courts’ duty to construe the Constitution. The background
surrounding Congress’s decision to enact RFRA offers an interesting—albeit incomplete—parallel to that of § 3501.
Before its decision in Employment Division v. Smith,494 the Supreme Court had applied a “compelling state interest test” to religious free exercise claims. In Smith, however, the Court replaced
that test with one permitting laws of general applicability to be enforced without substantially burdening the state. The Court reasoned “[t]hat the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general
applicability.’ ”495 The Smith majority thus qualified the compelling
interest test’s applicability to free exercise claims that might reasonably be restricted because they were geared to all citizens, not simply
those espousing a religious belief. However, certain members of
Congress (and a substantial coalition of interest groups) were convinced that the compelling state interest test was imperative to safeguard the free exercise of religious beliefs. To this end, Congress enacted RFRA, at least in part, to “restore the compelling interest test”
in assessing claims arising under the free exercise clause.496 Congress
thus statutorily revived a judicially crafted test that the Court had rejected.
rights before questioning is but one of the factors. . . . No one can predict with any
assurance what the Supreme Court might at some future date decide if these provisions are enacted.
Id. Comments on the floor of the House were similar. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 16,066
(1968) (remarks of Rep. Celler); 114 CONG. REC. 16,074 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Corman).
491. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
492. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
493. Id. at 529 (striking down Religious Freedom Restoration Act on ground that Congress had exceeded its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
494. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
495. Id. at 879 (internal quotation omitted).
496. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993).
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In striking RFRA down, however, the Court determined that
Congress had violated the constitutional separation of powers by requiring that courts use a standard of judicial review for free exercise
cases that the Court had expressly rejected as inconsistent with the
constitution. The Court explained that while Congress “has been
given the power to ‘enforce’ ” it has not been given “the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”497 The Court
concluded that “RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive
to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”498 By resurrecting a judicially rejected standard of review for a particular class of
constitutional cases, the Court concluded that Congress had improperly encroached upon the judicial power. The Court cautioned
that Congress’s attempt to impose the compelling state interest test
on the federal courts amounted to a competing interpretation of the
First Amendment. In other words, Congress was legislating the exercise of judicial power with respect to a discrete class of cases. “When
the Court has interpreted the Constitution,” the Court emphasized,
“it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch,” a power
constitutionally forbidden to the legislature.499
At first blush, this is precisely the situation confronting the Court
in Dickerson. Prior to Miranda, the Court analyzed the admissibility
of confessions under a “totality of the circumstances” standard derived from the Due Process Clause.500 Although it did not rewrite
the standards governing the Fifth Amendment inquiry itself,
Miranda altered the procedures governing the voluntariness determination by holding that no statements arising from a custodial interrogation would be admissible at trial unless the suspect was first
informed of her rights. In response to Miranda, Congress enacted
§ 3501 to resurrect the former “totality of the circumstances” voluntariness test.
The issue in Dickerson may therefore hinge on whether Congress
endeavored in § 3501 to overturn the Court’s Fifth Amendment interpretation of what constitutes “voluntariness,” or instead sought
497. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
498. Id. at 532.
499. Id. at 536.
500. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1961); Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1958).
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merely to replace the Court’s prophylactic rules safeguarding the
right with rules of its own creation. In my view, § 3501 can readily
be distinguished from RFRA because Congress did not instruct the
Supreme Court on how to interpret the compelled self-incrimination
clause. Nor does it attempt to offer a competing definition of “voluntariness.” Rather, Congress simply adopted new procedural rules
courts must use in determining whether a defendant’s statements
should be admitted at trial. The ultimate question of whether a confession is “voluntary,” for Fifth Amendment purposes, remains with
the courts. This is not altogether different from Congress’s authority
to promulgate the federal rules of evidence, many of which serve to
protect constitutional rights. The Sixth Amendment, for example,
affords defendants the right to “be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”501 The Court may define the legal effect of the confrontation clause, but Congress establishes the procedures by which
witnesses are called and by which the relevance of testimonial evidence is assessed. “This power,” the Court has observed, “rooted in
the authority of Congress conferred by . . . the Constitution to create inferior federal courts, is undoubted and has been frequently
noted and sustained.”502 Thus, an evidentiary rule may have as its
purpose the protection of a constitutional right, but Congress has
the authority to modify that rule, within certain limits, even where it
is forbidden to define the substantive right.
Moreover, although the Boerne Court did not offer Congress the
opportunity to engage in dialogue about the appropriate interpretation of the free exercise clause, the Miranda Court expressly invited
Congress (and the states) to search for effective means to protect
suspects’ rights. Indeed, the Miranda Court stressed that if it were
“shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising
accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous
opportunity to exercise it,” the Miranda warnings could be dispensed with altogether.503 Certainly, the Court would not have solicited legislative involvement of this sort if it were in fact construing a
federal constitutional provision. If the Miranda warnings were constitutionally compelled, then the Court would not—and if Boerne is

501. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
502. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1980) (citing cases).
503. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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correct—could not have invited Congress and the States to modify
them.
To understand the Court’s decision in Boerne, it is worth considering United States v. Klein.504 There, Congress had provided for the
recovery of private property the United States had captured during
the Civil War, if the claimant could prove that “he [had] never given
any aid or comfort to the . . . rebellion.”505 The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed judgments against the United States for such
property, based in part on the president’s decision to pardon certain
individuals.506 Angered by what it deemed to be a misuse of the statute, Congress dictated that “any pardon . . . granted by the President . . . shall be taken and deemed . . . conclusive evidence that
such person did take part in and give aid and comfort to the . . . rebellion.”507 Disgruntled claimants challenged the statute as an impermissible congressional interpretation of the legal effect of a presidential pardon. Faced with a hostile Congress during a particularly
difficult historical period, the Court nonetheless concluded that the
statute breached separation of powers both with respect to the president’s pardon power—by effectively nullifying it—and with respect
to the judicial power, namely, by prescribing the legal effect of a pardon. Congress, in effect, removed from the federal courts’ purview
the construction of the pardon power and forced upon the courts a
specific constitutional interpretation.
Section 3501, by contrast, is not an effort to establish a binding
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, or to direct the legal outcome of a case. If Congress had sought to dictate what constituted a
voluntary confession for Fifth Amendment purposes, then it might
be trenching upon judicial authority. Instead, Congress merely outlined the circumstances under which a “voluntary,” as defined by the
Court, confession could be admitted into evidence. Had the Court
not been adamant about Miranda’s status as a prophylactic rule, designed to combat the effects of inherently coercive custodial interrogations, § 3501 might pose a problem. Unlike RFRA, which presupposed that the courts would reject the First Amendment claim or

504. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
505. Id. at 131.
506. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 131-33 (citing as an example United States v. Padleford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870)).
507. Id. at 135.
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defense as “without merit” as long as Smith remained intact, § 3501
does no such thing.
D. The Court’s Institutional Limitations
The Miranda warnings are predicated on the ground that custodial interrogations are inherently coercive and that any statements
obtained during such an interrogation are necessarily “compelled” in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Before Miranda, the Court had
struggled to fashion an effective test to determine whether a statement was voluntarily given.508 In light of the “difficulty in depicting
what transpires at [police] interrogations,”509 the Court could not
reliably ascertain whether a suspect’s statement had been the product
of a free will.510 Rather than engage in a likely fruitless factual inquiry, the Court instead concluded that bright-line rules would help
“to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not become but a ‘form of words,’ in the hands of government officials.”511
The very existence of such a rule serves to underscore the Court’s
limited institutional ability to assure, in the custodial context, the
suspect’s right against compelled self-incrimination.
As a result, the warnings serve to protect the right, in part by
removing from courts the need to engage in a searching factual inquiry, but are not themselves constitutionally guaranteed. While
functionally significant, the warnings are nothing more than a nonconstitutional anticipatory remedy. They are “anticipatory” or “pro-

508. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963). The line between
proper and permissible police conduct and techniques, and methods offensive to due process
is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is necessary to make
fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the
mind and will of an accused. See id. The critical inquiry was whether the physical or the psychological coercion was of such a degree that “the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he
confessed.” Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
509. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). The Court explained that “[t]he
difficulty in depicting what transpires at such interrogations stems from the fact that in this
country they have largely taken place incommunicado.” Id. The Court also noted that
“[p]rivacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact
goes on in the interrogation rooms.” Id. at 448; see id. at 470 (arguing that presence of attorney will enhance trustworthiness of subsequent testimony regarding interrogation).
510. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69. The Court in Miranda described the difficulty in
making “[a]ssessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed” as to the right to remain
silent. Id. at 468. In addition, the Court noted the “evils” present in the interrogation atmosphere. Id. at 456.
511. Id. at 444 (quotation omitted).
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phylactic” because they do not cure a present violation; rather, they
serve to avert a potential violation. Of course, whether a suspect (or
a class of future suspects) was coerced into confession is necessarily a
factual question.512 It is one thing, however, for the Court to make a
factual determination based upon a case presently before it, and quite
another for the Court to predict the facts of a case that may come
before it at some future date. Conclusive presumptions that anticipate future factual scenarios are “designed to avoid the costs of excessive inquiry where a per se rule will achieve the correct result in
almost all cases.”513 The Miranda Court explained that pursuant to
the conclusive presumption it established, “we will not pause to enquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his
rights without a warning being given.”514 Such presumptions “require the Court to make broad generalizations . . . . Cases that do
not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the
judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important
to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them.”515 The
Miranda Court essentially made a “predictive” factual determination
that in future cases courts would have a difficult time discovering
whether a confession was voluntarily communicated. If the problem
sought to be remedied (inherently coercive custodial interrogations)
does not exist, however, or if the Court’s “generalization” is incorrect as a factual matter, may Congress dispense with, or at least modify, the prophylaxis? I think so.
Conclusive presumptions like the one Miranda sets forth are dictated by convenience, not the Constitution. Congress, while refusing
to quibble with the Court’s construction of the Fifth Amendment,
nevertheless rejected the factual assertion underpinning the Court’s
decision to mandate warnings; namely, that custodial interrogations
are inherently coercive.516 Congress enjoys a significant institutional
advantage over the Court in gathering facts. Unlike the Court, Congress is not bound by the parties’ submissions; rather, it can conduct
hearings, canvass constituents, and obtain information from a broad
512. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 515; Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534.
513. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991).
514. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
515. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
516. In fact, the Dickerson court recognized that Congress had “concluded that custodial
interrogations were not inherently coercive.” United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 692
n.22 (1999).
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range of sources. As Thomas C. Lynch, then Attorney General of
California, emphasized during the hearings on § 3501:
Congress, with its vastly superior fact-gathering powers, is in a
much better position than the Court to formulate standards most
likely to result in a correct determination, in a given case, of the issue of voluntariness of a confession. * * * If findings of fact are
made by Congress that demonstrate the relevance and importance
of these factors, and their superiority over the rules laid down in
Miranda, it would seem that the Court would have little choice
but to defer to the expert judgment of Congress.517

In assessing the evidence before it, Congress concluded that the
Court’s factual basis for creating an anticipatory remedy for all custodial interrogations was unsound. During the subcommittee hearings, for example, Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter
pointed out
that the so-called third-degree methods deplored by the Supreme
Court and cited as a basis for their opinion in Miranda is not a correct portrayal of what actually goes on in police stations across the
country. While there are isolated cases of police using coercive tactics, this is the exception rather than the rule.518

Buttressed by data collected from a broad range of sources, and
after considerable deliberation and debate, the Senate Judiciary
Committee concluded that “the Court overreacted to defense claims
that police brutality is widespread.”519 While Congress could neither
change the outcome of Miranda, nor alter the Court’s constitutional
definition of voluntariness, it could, and did, reject the Court’s
broader prediction that all custodial questioning is inherently coercive and any statement resulting therefrom is involuntary. As a consequence of this determination, the Committee Report explained
that “the voluntariness test does not offend the Constitution or deprive a defendant of any constitutional right.”520 And how could it?
The Court had not rejected the voluntariness test per se, rather, it
had simply drafted bright line rules to make the voluntariness determination easier to assess.
517. See 1S. REP. NO. 90-1097, 47 (1968) (quoting Thomas C. Lynch, State of California Attorney General), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2133.
518. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, 47 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2134.
519. Id. at 48.
520. Id. at 51.
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Critics may complain that Congress did not collect sufficient information or give thoughtful consideration to the information it acquired. But Congress, by comparison, had considerably more information at its disposal than the Court. By its own admission, the
Miranda Court had little evidence that police brutality was widespread at the time it rendered its decision. To support its conclusion,
it relied principally upon the famed Wickersham Committee Report,521 then more than thirty years old, as well as a number of anecdotal reports of police brutality. The Court’s perusal of various police interrogations manuals, none of which was demonstrated to have
been used by any actual police force, hardly painted an irrefutable
picture of interrogation procedures. As Justice White pointed out in
dissent, “for all the Court’s expounding on the menacing atmosphere of police interrogation procedures, it has failed to supply any
foundation for the conclusions it draws or the measures it adopts.”522
The Court even recognized its inherent institutional limitations
when it invited Congress to “search for increasingly effective ways of
protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.” What constitutes an “increasingly
effective way” is at base an empirical question. The Court has observed that conclusive presumptions of this sort “should not be applied . . . in situations where the generalization is incorrect as an empirical matter.”523 In truth, “the justification for a conclusive
presumption disappears when application of the presumption will not
reach the correct result most of the time.”524 Congress had the benefit both of taking testimony regarding the pre-Miranda world, and
testimony concerning the impact of Miranda upon law enforcement
efforts. Based upon this information, Congress concluded the basis
for Miranda’s conclusive presumption—that unwarned custodial interrogations are inherently coercive—was incorrect as an empirical
matter, and the presumption does not reach the correct result—
suppressing only involuntary confessions—most of the time that it is
applied. According to the Subcommittee’s findings, the Judiciary
Committee was able specifically to conclude that § 3501 “would be
an effective way of protecting the rights of the individual and would
521. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in
Law Enforcement (1931).
522. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
523. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991).
524. Id.
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promote efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.”525 The Court
has traditionally permitted such a determination considerable deference because Congress “is far better equipped than the judiciary to
amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative
questions.”526 In an insightful dissenting and concurring opinion,
Justice O’Connor criticized Miranda’s “presumption of coercion”
not as an “impenetrable barrier to the introduction of compelled testimony,”527 but rather as “leaking like a sieve.”528
Congress, then, far from overruling the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, instead merely rejected the
Court’s factual predicate and the anticipatory remedy tailored to
mend that predicate. Of course, critics may grumble that factual determinations are a matter of degree. To some extent, every interpretative decision is grounded in a construction of the facts. If Congress
could simply substitute its own factual determination for that of the
Court, it might be able to override any of the Court’s ultimate legal
conclusions. Such a fear, however, does not imply that Congress can
never substitute its fact-related conclusions for those of the Court.
And the case favoring such congressional action may be particularly
strong where the Court has expressly invited the legislature to continue searching for measures to safeguard fundamental rights. As part
of that search, Congress must necessarily gather information and
from that information, draw legal conclusions.
As the Judiciary Committee had previously observed, Congress’s
substitution of its own factual determination for that of the Court is
not without precedent. In a thinly veiled effort to prevent certain
non-English speaking minorities from voting, North Carolina enacted a statute that established English literacy as a voting prerequisite. The statute’s opponents challenged that literacy requirement as
a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Lassiter v. North Hampton Election Board,529 however, the Court upheld the statute’s facial constitutionality. Congress, however, differed
with the Court’s conclusion. Finding, as a factual matter, that such
525. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 51 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2137.
526. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (internal
quotations omitted).
527. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 712 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
528. Id.
529. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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requirements did infringe upon equal protection interests, Congress
passed § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which provided that literary
requirements could not be enforced against anyone educated beyond
the sixth grade in state accredited schools. Shortly thereafter, § 4(e)
was attacked as an improper encroachment upon the judicial power.
Congress, it was argued, could not enact such a law unless it was first
determined that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the right to
be secured (or wrong to be abolished). Otherwise, there would be
no right for Congress to enforce. Because the Lassiter Court had
found no equal protection violation with respect to English literacy
requirements, § 4(e) was alleged to be an unconstitutional encroachment upon the Court’s power to “say what the law is.”
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,530 however, the Court ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s implementation clause endowed Congress
with broad discretion limited solely by the need for a causal nexus
between the right sought to be enforced and the factual evidence before Congress. The issue in Katzenbach was whether § 4(e) could,
consistent with the Constitution, prevent enforcement of a statute
that the judiciary had not declared unconstitutional. Opponents
claimed that Congress could not enact such a law unless it first determined that the right to be secured (or wrong to be remedied) was
somehow guaranteed by the underlying substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Supreme Court had found no
such right (or wrong) to exist with respect to English literacy requirements in Lassiter, § 4(e) was alleged to be an unconstitutional
encroachment upon the Court’s power to “say what the law is.” The
Court nevertheless concluded that Congress had sufficient factual
evidence before it to support a reasonable conclusion that § 4(e) was
necessary to prevent a denial of equal protection. Congress’s factual
determination, while different from that of the Court, was not construed as trenching upon the judicial power—even though it had
specific legal consequences.
If Congress can substitute its own factual determination for that
of the Court in concluding that a right is not being properly enforced, then presumably, the reverse is also true. In other words, if
the Court, as a factual matter, predicts evil in certain circumstances,
but Congress decides no possible evil exists, then Congress can substitute its own legislative determination, and corresponding prophy530. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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laxis, for that of the Court. Congress could not legislatively dictate
the admission of an involuntary confession because that would alter a
judicial interpretation, but it may be able statutorily to fashion procedural rules whereby an otherwise voluntary confession would be
admitted. Congress may, under this theory, alter the means for protecting any right the Supreme Court has identified, provided Congress’s alternative mechanism adequately vindicates that right. If it
has sufficient evidence, Congress may choose to secure the underlying constitutional right in ways different from that of the Court.
Contrary to what many in legal academia seem to believe, judges
do not possess an exclusive monopoly on constitutional interpretation. Legislators and Executive Branch officials must also interpret
the Constitution while performing their functions. While past judicial interpretations may guide them, they are nevertheless free,
within certain limitations, to enforce their own constitutional determinations.531 For those troubled by such congressional power, it is
worth noting that the Court is always free to reexamine congressional efforts.
In essence, this differs little from what the Court has encouraged
Congress to do with respect to legislative findings pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez,532 for example, the
Court invalidated the so-called Gun-Free School Zones Act on the
ground that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause
to reach activity that had a tenuous connection to interstate commerce.533 In reaching that decision, the Court insinuated that “to the
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect
was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.”534 Properly
drawn congressional findings can thus help support statutes the
531. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 707, 747 (1985) (“Members of Congress have both the authority and the capability to
participate constructively in constitutional interpretation.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221-27 (1994)
(discussing shared power among legislative, judicial, and executive branches to “say what the
law is”); Neal E. Devins, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 661, 662 (1986) (book review) (“Congress and the executive are undoubtedly authorized to interpret the Constitution.”).
532. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
533. See id. at 561.
534. Id. at 563.
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courts would otherwise invalidate on constitutional grounds.535Pursuant to Lopez, Congress’s failure to include legislative findings may
diminish, though not completely eliminate, the deference accorded
to its legislative product. In both the Commerce Clause and the
Fifth Amendment settings, the Court seems to have acknowledged
Congress’s authority to legislate within certain loosely prescribed parameters that may be adjusted on the basis of congressional findings.
While Congress did not attach express findings to § 3501, it held
hearings on the statute, filed a comprehensive report, and engaged—
both in the House and Senate—in considerable floor debate. To the
extent particular legislative findings are necessary, they are laid out in
the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report and in the floor debate.
Even so, meaningful differences may distinguish the legislative
findings context in Lopez from that in Miranda. The issue in Lopez
required the Court to demarcate the limits of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause to infringe state interests. The existence
of specific legislative findings provides some guarantee that Congress
has properly considered whether it has constitutional authority to
legislate in the area.536 The legislative findings serve to enable the
Court to determine whether the legislation stayed within Congress’s
Commerce Clause boundaries.
In contrast, the real issue in Dickerson is how best to protect the
right against compelled self-incrimination, given the need for effective law enforcement. In reviewing § 3501, the Court need not focus
exclusively on whether the statute, viewed in isolation, satisfactorily
protects the Fifth Amendment right, but whether in light of all the
changes in federal law (and federal law enforcement) the right is be535. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (requiring
Congress to justify affirmative action legislation with specific findings because “classifications
based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic, it is especially important
that the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified”) (citation omitted); Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971) (upholding congressional power to regulate loan
sharking).
536. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-54 (1985) (noting that structure of federal system provided inherent protections to state interests); see also
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 191-95 (1982) (developing view that Congress protects state sovereignty); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 804960 (1982) (describing states’ role in federal system); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546-47 (1954) (describing role of states in selection and
composition of Congress).
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ing adequately protected. If Congress has provided a satisfactory alternative to Miranda, not just in § 3501, but in the training of federal law enforcement officers, the creation of Bivens 537 suits, etc.,
then the factual predicate for mandating warnings may no longer exist and the Court can simply dispense with the warnings. At a minimum, Dickerson affords the Court with the opportunity to revisit the
problem of protecting Fifth Amendment rights—a problem seemingly in need of review.
E. Is § 3501 Adequate to Protect the Right Against Compelled SelfIncrimination?
Aside from the myriad decisions suggesting that the Miranda
warnings are but a prophylactic device to secure Fifth Amendment
guarantees, the Court has also stated on occasion that the issues presented in Miranda are of “constitutional dimensions.”538 Miranda’s
chief apologists often cite Withrow v. Williams,539 for example, to
support the view that the warnings are constitutionally compelled,
hence unalterable. In Withrow, the Court held that a state prisoner
who alleges a Miranda violation states a constitutional claim that is
cognizable on federal habeas review. Unlike the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, which serves to protect constitutional privacy interests,540 the Court has squarely held that a police officer’s
failure to comply with Miranda constitutes a violation of “federal
law” or the “Constitution” for purposes of the habeas statute. The
Court explained that “[p]rophylactic though it may be, in protecting
a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
Miranda safeguards a fundamental trial right.”541
What does the Court mean with its apparently conflicting statements with respect to the Miranda warnings’ constitutional status?
Essentially, prophylactic or not, the Miranda warnings are based
upon the Court’s decision to create an anticipatory remedy to facilitate compliance with the Fifth Amendment. As such, the warnings
serve to safeguard the right to be free from coerced confessions.

537. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
538. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
539. 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
540. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976) (distinguishing Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule as one designed to deter illegal searches and seizures).
541. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).
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Something, then, is needed to safeguard the right. The question is
what that something is—and whether Congress is empowered to
create it. In Dickerson, of course, the issue is whether § 3501 acceptably reflects Congress’s efforts to provide alternative safeguards
to ensure that statements to law enforcement officers are voluntary.
That question does not properly capture what the Court’s inquiry
must be. Properly framed, the question is whether current safeguards
exist, including, but not limited to § 3501, to protect Fifth Amendment rights.
Although academics have fretted about the inadequacy of the
voluntariness test, none have demonstrated that it is an appreciably
less effective means of protecting a suspect’s rights and balancing
those rights against society’s interest in effective law enforcement.
The Court assumed, without the benefit of careful inquiry, that unwarned custodial interrogations necessarily produced coerced statements. But the Court had no idea—other than a bit of speculation
leavened by some common sense—that Miranda warnings would
have their intended effect. However one may feel about the policy of
Miranda, the Court was not necessarily in the best position to determine the extent of police misconduct, to balance the interests of
law enforcement and personal liberty, and to fashion a policy governing police interrogation. Of course, it really didn’t attempt to do the
latter. Instead, it merely borrowed warnings previously devised by
the Executive Branch. Perhaps the determination of whether § 3501
will “work” as an alternative to mandated warnings simply can not
be made until the statute is enforced.542
I would venture to say that there is less police brutality now than
in 1966, or certainly than in 1931, the year the Wickersham Report
was published. Although the data are admittedly inconclusive, there
is some evidence to suggest that law enforcement officials abuse suspects’ rights far less than during the era preceding Miranda.543
542. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy explained it this way:
The Miranda decision has petrified the law of pre-trial interrogation for
the past twenty years, foreclosing the possibility of developing and implementing alternatives that would be of greater effectiveness both in protecting the public from crime and in ensuring fair treatment of persons
suspected of crime . . . Nothing is left to the change in the future as long
as Miranda remains in effect and perpetuates a perceived risk of invalidation for any alternative system that departs from it.
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 2933, at 99.
543. See Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police In-
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Doubtless, law enforcement agencies provide more, and better,
training and almost certainly place greater stress on internal disciplinary procedures. The so-called educative effect of Miranda may even
have run its course. Indeed, it might be argued today that Miranda
warnings have become a shield for law enforcement. In other words,
once the suspect has signed the waiver of rights card, the magistrate
will look no further. The type of judicial scrutiny available in a
“totality of the circumstances” test expands the cursory examination
of the rights card to ensure that the signature is indeed the suspect’s.
The legal landscape has also changed considerably since Miranda
exploded onto the scene. First, it must be remembered that involuntary confessions, as opposed to “mere” Miranda violations, will always be excluded at trial.544 No revival of § 3501 will change that.
Additionally, expanded criminal and civil penalties provide both a
deterrent to police misconduct and relief to citizens whose rights
have been violated. A federal civil rights statute that existed before
Miranda criminalized the actions of anyone who “under color of any
Law . . . willfully subjects any person in any state, territory, or District to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”545Similarly, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 prohibit conspiracies that violate
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has itself only recently
noted that, “[b]eating to obtain a confession plainly violates section
242.”546
Congress has also broadened criminal and civil liability for civil
rights’ violations. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,547 the
terrogation in America, in 18 CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 35 (1992), reprinted in
THE MIRANDA DEBATE 65, 65-66 (1998) (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds.,
1998); NEAL A. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACT OF
MIRANDA 208-20 (1971) (describing impact of Miranda on interrogation behavior); JEROME
H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE
18-20, 58-59 (1993) (asserting that law enforcement officials currently use less force in questioning defendants, due in part to better training, than in decades past); Paul G. Cassell and
Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of
Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 871-76 (1996); Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in
Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1970) (asserting that
Denver police had much improved rate of proper Miranda warnings because of better training).
544. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978).
545. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
546. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997).
547. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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Court held that individuals could sue government officials directly
for constitutional injuries.548 Since Bivens, individuals can recover,
contingent upon official immunity doctrine, for injuries arising out
of coercive interrogations. And, the Court has clarified that violations of the right against compelled self-incrimination may constitute
the basis for a Bivens claim.549
In addition, Congress waived the federal immunity from such
claims in a 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act.550 In
response to publicity surrounding several notorious raids by federal
law enforcement personnel, Congress authorized suit under the
FTCA for Bivens claims as well as for some intentional torts that are
based upon acts or omissions of law enforcement officers.551Specifically, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress has made it possible for citizens to sue for claims arising “out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.”552 As a result, victims can now sue both the government and
individual law enforcement officers for abusive interrogation tactics.
In Dickerson, the Court’s responsibility will not only be to determine whether § 3501 is adequate, but whether the legal landscape
has so changed in the thirty-plus years since Miranda was handed
down that sufficient alternative safeguards to Miranda warnings exist
to ensure the voluntariness of statements and to protect the right
against self-incrimination. So the question of whether § 3501, standing alone, is equally protective of suspects’ rights is beside the point.
The real question for the Court to consider is whether, today, sufficient means are in place to protect suspects, as well as to promote efficient law enforcement. As Professor Cassell has explained, “Taken
together, the combination of criminal, civil, and administrative

548. See id. at 397.
549. Moreover, victims of police overreaching can now sue municipalities directly under
§ 1983 for any unconstitutional policy. See Monnell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1989). This option did not exist at the time of the Miranda decision. See generally Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 168 (1961).
550. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994).
551. Id. at § 2680(h). Cf. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1435-36 (9th Cir.
1994) (recognizing possible FTCA claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising
out of arrest by law enforcement officials). Criminal penalties are currently theoretically available against law enforcement officials as well. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 26871 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 242 to apply to constitutional injuries inflicted by officers acting
under color of state law).
552. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994).
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remedies now available for coerced confessions—along with the Fifth
Amendment’s exclusion of involuntary statements—renders
Miranda’s prophylactic remedy overprotective and therefore subject
to modification in § 3501.”553
IX. CONCLUSION
Although the politics surrounding this issue are complex, the issue itself is not terribly complicated. The Fourth Circuit has observed that if the Constitution mandates the Miranda warnings,
then: Congress lacked the authority to enact § 3501, and Miranda
continues to control the admissibility of confessions in federal court.
If it is not required by the Constitution, then Congress possesses the
authority to supercede Miranda legislatively, and § 3501 controls
the admissibility of confessions in federal court.554
The apparent simplicity of the legal issue, however, belies the
complexity of the political debate and touches upon the appropriate
role of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution, and of
Congress in prescribing constitutional norms. Crucial to this determination is the degree to which Congress may rely upon its institutional advantages to promulgate rules that serve to safeguard constitutional guarantees. These are questions that extend well beyond
Dickerson and will continue to be debated as the Court further inserts itself into the national political discourse, and Congress further
hands difficult questions to the judiciary. I have tried to articulate a
role for Congress in this ongoing constitutional dialogue. Far from
being a bit player, Congress has an active role to play in securing
rights. It is a role Congress must not abdicate. To the extent it does,
our personal liberties will be compromised.
Constitutional questions aside, however, the passage of time is
not an insignification factor to consider. While past administrations
have signaled their support for the statute, none has consistently
sought to enforce it. As a consequence, Miranda has flourished
while § 3501 has withered. Rightly or wrongly, Miranda has evolved
into a symbol of the Warren Court, and its supposedly noble efforts
to rewrite the Constitution to champion broadly defined individual
liberties. Indeed, few decisions have entered the popular consciousness quite so thoroughly. A number of participants in this on-going
553. Cassell, supra note 72, at 247.
554. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 687-88 (4th Cir. 1999).
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debate privately concede that the Miranda warnings have little continuing value as a code of police procedure, but have argued instead
that they symbolize a particular era, and with that era a method of
constitutional interpretation. While a laches defense of some sort
may be appropriate to consider, Miranda’s “symbolic” effect should
not trump an otherwise constitutional act of Congress. Surely, had
Miranda gone unenforced, legal scholars of the time would have
howled. In this article, I have sought to revisit the congressional debates surrounding § 3501’s enactment and to illuminate some of the
constitutional issues implicated by Congressional efforts to rewrite
the rules protecting the privilege against compelled selfincrimination. Section 3501 has languished far too long in legislative
purgatory.555

555. Of course, this determination in and of itself may unleash a new storm of protest—
and not only in the academic community. The Justice Department has not merely declined to
raise § 3501; it has actually joined the defendant in arguing that the statute is unconstitutional.
This sets up an interesting constitutional conflict. Even if the Court finds that § 3501 has replaced the Miranda warnings, the Executive Branch arguably retains authority to abide by
Miranda in spirit—or perhaps even in the flesh—should it seek to resurrect the legal theories
of Andrew Jackson or Abraham Lincoln.
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